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FOREWORD
The lessons learned in the Skylab Program are described in five
basic documents prepared by and representing the experience of NASA
Headquarters, the Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center, the John F. Kennedy
Space Center, and the Skylab and Saturn Program Offices at the GeOrge
C. Marshall Space Flight Center. The documents are intended primarily
for use by persons who are familiar with the disciplines covered and
who are involved in other programs. Thus, the individual lessons are
brief rather than detailed.
Authors of the lessons have been encouraged to be candid. The
reader may detect apparent differences in approach in some areas, illus-
trating that equally effective management action in a particular area
frequently can be accomplished by several approaches.
The recommendations and actions described are not necessarily
the only or the best approaches, but they reflect Skylab experience
that must be tailored to other situations and should be accepted by
the reader as one input to the management decisionmaking process. As
such, these recommendations, which are based on approaches that were
found to be effective in the Skylab Program, should be used to help
identify potential problems of future space programs. Many of the
lessons are subjective and represent individual opinions and should not
be interpreted as official statements of NASA positions or policies.
In addition to the Skylab Lessons Learned documents, Skylab
Mission Evaluation Reports are being issued by the previously mentioned
NASA agencies to provide detailed evaluation results. The results of
the scientific experiments will be disseminated by the Principal
Investigators.
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3S.L.L. No.: i-I
TITLE: MANAS SCIENTIFICOBSERVERANDIN-FLIGHTREPAIRMAN
LESSON LEARNED: The Skylab missions demonstrated that man can serve as
a scientific observer and in-flight repairman to a substantially greater
extent than anticipated before the first Skylab mission. The crews
found that the absence of gravity was not a hindrance in performing
their planned activities. In many respects, the crews were able to do
more than expected.
BACKGROUND: Before the Skylab missions, there were uncertainties as to
the ability of astronauts to perform in-flight repairs (either sched-
uled or unscheduled). The Skylab experience showed that the crews were
not hampered by the lack of gravity in any restrictive way. Suitable
restraints were needed for all tasks, but existing structure frequently
served as suitable restraint.
S.L.L. No.:
TITLE: IN-ORBIT REPAIR AND MAINTENANCE
LESSON LEARNED: In-orbit repair and maintenance can be performed
satisfactorily in zero g. In-flight maintenance guidelines should
include the following:
i--2
i. Consider extravehicular activity (EVA) as a normal means of repair.
2. Provide proper procedures, tools, and equipment for crew usage.
3. Design equipment to facilitate potential in-flight maintenance.
4. Consider EVA inspection and repair during the design requirements
phase of a program.
5. Provide for the effective containment of nuts, bolts, washers,
tools, hardware components, etc., by means of tool and/or retainer
boxes, bungee cords, etc.
6. Provide for a worksite, repair bench, or equivalent equipped with
adequate restraints for tools and equipment.
7. Provide spares for those hardware items most likely to require
servicing and/or replacement.
8. Promote the use of standard-size screws, bolts, etc., in the space-
craft design.
pRECEDING PAGE B_ NOT
9. Provide a high-fidelity maintenance training simulator.
10.
Provide the capability to reservice fluid and gas systems from the
interior of the spacecraft. Fluid/gaseous connectors (B-nuts,
weld or solder joints) should be located and configured such that
they can be inspected by the crew for leaks.
ll. Design panels to allow replacement of indicator lights from the
front of the panels.
12.
Design external protective covers for experiments and other equip-
ment for manual operation by EVA as well as by automatic opening.
An EVA manual override may benecessary if automatic opening
fails.
13. Single force fasteners should be used to close out all access
panels in lieu of slotted or Phillips head screws
BACKGROUND: The Skylab crew demonstrated conclusively the capability
to perform a wide variety of in-orbit maintenance and servicing tasks.
Some of the more significant examples were:
i. The Skylab 4 crew reserviced the primary coolant system on the air-
lock module after the fluid leaked out and the operating pressure
had dropped essentially to zero. Reservicing had not been
considered until the system started leaking in orbit.
.
Two EVA crewmen freed the 0WS solar array wing by cutting a small
metal strip, which was holding the solar array beam in a retracted
position. The crew used a rope strap to pull on the solar array
beam and break the hydraulic damper, which had frozen in the re-
tracted position.
.
A replacement package of six rate gyros was installed by the
Skylab 3 crew. The necessary electrical jumper cables were hooked
up by EVA.
.
Numerous items of experiment equipment were repaired by the crew
after failure in orbit. One case included EVA rewiring of a
microwave antenna drive system.
S.L.L. No.: 1-3
TITLE: NEGLIGIBLE FFECTSOFCREWMOTIONDISTURBANCE
LESSON LEARNED: Disturbances caused by crew motion were small enough
to allow solar telescope pointing stability of better than i arc second.
Only intentional large motions by the crew were detectable in the solar
telescope images.
BACKGROUND: Crew motion disturbances were essentially undetectable in
the Apollo telescope mount solar telescopes except when the crew
intentionally induced large disturbances. In many cases, the crew
conducted normal experiment or operational activities in other parts
of Skylab without interference to the solar telescope observation.
S.L.L. No.: 1-4
TITLE: VIDEO UPLINK CAPABILITY
LESSON LEARNED: A capability to uplink and to play back video within
the spacecraft should be provided. This would enable the crew to
observe repair procedures worked out on the ground and to see details
of hardware they may have to repair in orbit. Scientific information
such as solar activity drawings or Earth observations data could also
be uplinked.
BACKGROUND: The Capability to uplink video was not provided in Skylab;
however, there were numerous times in the mission when it would have
been valuable.
S.L.L. No.: 1-5
TITLE: FOOD SYSTEM DESIGN
LESSON LEARNED: The following three items are recommended in the design
of food systems where long-term space flight is involved.
le Response, simplicity, cost, and amount of documentation can be
optimized if standard menus are planned and provided, so that all
crewmen are eating the same basic meal at the same time. Indi-
vidual preferences can be provided in beverage, snack, spices, and
dessert selection from an onboard pantry.
H
6o
Pantry-type food storage as opposed to meal-sequence food storage:
Particularly for long-term flight, it is recommended that a
pantry-style food storage system be implemented. In this type
system, all identical foods are stored in the same location, and
a meal is prepared by selecting the desired foods from the storage
area in much the same manner as a home pantry. This stowage
arrangement provides flexibility in implementing real-time desires
and planning as may be required to support changes to mission
duration, time lines, crew health, etc.
.
Operational system as opposed to experiment support: The $kylab
food system served two purposes: (1) It was the operational
system for supplying the crewmembers nou#ishment, as well as,
(2) being a large element of the M070, Mineral Balance Medical
Experiment series. These types of experiment requirements on the
food system involved increased costs and manufacturing complexity
and impacted crew preference, and flexibility; at times, these
food system requirements increased the overall complexity of
mission operations. It is recommended, if feasible, that the
operational food system be isolated and controlled separately
from the experiment food or formulation that would be used in
connection with any nutrition or medical experiments.
BACKGROUND: The $kylab food system provided custom menus for each
crewmember. These custom menus were balanced nutritionally and were
per the mineral level requirements of the M070, Mineral Balance, exper-
iment series. The food was then oriented in a meal sequence and loaded
in the ll food lockers by a preestablished orientation list. Before
the mission, continuous detail coordination and followup were performed
in developing crew menus that met the experiment as well as nutritional
and crew preference requirements. Any change in menu before the flight
resulted in documentation revision and coordination with the contractors
and the NASA offices. Secondly, involved crew procedures and lengthy
documentation included cue cards, flight data files, and experiment
checklists to document the onboard storage and food use requirements.
In essence, the meal-oriented sequence approach provided a single
stowage sequence of approximately 8000 items; and, once on board, real-
time changes and updates in crew preference, experiment requirements,
or menu changes for any reason necessitated excessive food handling and
recordkeeping. The pantry arrangement would eliminate much of the
paperwork, recerdkeeping, and system tracking and would provide maximum
flexibility to the crew and to the ground for coping with real-time
changes. The pantry-storage approach appears to be most reasonable for
long-term missions.
S.L.L. No.: 1-6
TITLE: TRASHCOLLECTIONANDDISPOSAL
LESSON LEARNED: Trash should be separated into biologically active and
inactive material. Daily disposal of active material is necessary,
whereas less frequent disposal of inactive material is satisfactory.
Stowage of collected trash "external" to the habitable volume of the
spacecraft is highly desirable. Food containers make up the bulk of
the trash and should be designed to consume minimum volume when
expended. A compactor seems like a desirable feature. Backups and
contingency plans are necessary.
BACKGROUND: Considerable crew time was spent in Skylab managing the
trash situation. Additional temporary collection sites were needed to
allow trash to be easily and conveniently stowed during the rush of the
workday and collected and disposed of when time allowed. A failure of
the trash airlock would have been a significant impact on the habita-
bility of the spacecraft.
S.L.L. No.: 1-7
TITLE: WINDOWS IN SPACECRAFT
LESSON LEARNED: A large, simple window in the Skylab wardroom out of
which the crew could observe the Earth and cosmos provided one of the
more important means of relaxation. Much of the value of this type
window would have been lost if it had not been located in the crew
quarters.
BACKGROUND: The Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo missions all demonstrated
the value of adequate viewing windows. Although there was appreciable
opposition when the wardroom window was proposed for Skylab, this
window proved to be invaluable.
S.L.L. No.: 1-8
TITLE : GARMENT REQUIREMENTS
LESSON LEARNED: Two-piece garments (such as pants and shirts, as
opposed to coveralls) proved convenient in Skylab for the same reasons
as on Earth. Two-piece garments are less sensitive to fit, are more
adjustable to clothing requirements, and are more convenient to personal
hygiene procedures. Spacecraft interiors are very clean. Clothing
gets soiled principally from the wearer's body. More underwear and
socks and fewer outer garments should be provided.
Elastic or knitted cuffs to prevent sleeves and pant legs from riding
up are not required. They were sometimes an inconvenience. Headgear
as a protective device is not required.
Location and design of pockets warrants engineering study and a real-
ization that the types and locations found practical in aircraft flying
Suits and in streetwear may not be so practical in space-flight
garments. Do not compromisepockets to suit styling of the garment.
Garmentmaterial must resist abrasion, especially footwear, if it has
to interface -with "force-fit" type foot restraints.
BACKGROUND: Skylab crews felt that the outer garments could be worn
1 or 2 weeks without needing change, but underwear and socks should be
changed daily. They wore out shoe toes rubbing them against the grid
flooring.
The crewmen tended to carry everything from nail clippers to mainte-
nance tools in their pockets, and a better pocket design would have
been helpful.
TITLE: PERSONAL HYGIENE EQUIPMENT
S.L.L. No.: 1-9
LESSON LEARNED: A wider range of hygiene and grooming equipment and
expendables should be provided, probably as a personalized kit for
each crewman. The quantity of soap supplied on board Skylab was based
on a usage rate of one bar/man/2 weeks plus five bars/month for house-
keeping and cleaning tasks, yielding a total of 55 bars. The Skylab 2
crew used only one bar of soap for the entire mission as opposed to the
ll allocated for use. A reevaluation of the quantity of soap to be
flown should be made based on the Skylab 3 and Skylab 4 data.
BACKGROUND: Various Skylab crewmen complained that the personal hygiene
items did not meet their accustomed standards, and consequently they
avoided some items such as the shower soap, toothpaste, shampoo, and
razors. The shower soap left some crewmen with a "stinging" sensation,
hence they quit using it. The shampoo had a distinctly unpleasant
odor, hence was avoided. The toothpaste was not ingestible and the
inconvenience of zero-g spitting caused some crewmen to use it spar-
ingly. The safety razors clogged badly with no way to use the one-g
"slosh-in-the-water" convention in the zero-g environment.
9S.L.L. No.: i-i0
TITLE: INTRAVEHICULAR ACTIVITY AND EXTRAVEHIC_ ACTIVITY RESTRAINTS
LESSON LEARNED: Intravehicular activity (IVA) and extravehicular
activity (EVA) foot and body restraints are required to accomplish use-
ful work in zero g in large volume spacecraft. The triangle shoes used
for foot restraints with the orbital workshop (OWS) grid floor worked
very well at the workstations. Based on Skylab experience, future
shoes of this design should be made more durable and should have zippers
rather than laces to facilitate donning and removing.
BACKGROUND: Restraints should be uniform throughout the spacecraft and
should be attached to the spacecraft and not the crewman. Once
engaged, they should require no further conscious consideration until
the crewman is ready to disengage. The triangle grid-floor shoes and
thigh restraint provided excellent restraints for use in the OWS for
IVA work, while a "universal" foot restraint is required for EVA work.
S.L.L. No.: 1-11
TITLE: WRITING AND WORKTABLE FOR IN-ORBIT USE
LESSON LEARNED: Frequent and extensive paperwork activities were
required on board Skylab to update checklists, flight plans, etc., and
to accomplish routine experimental and operational logging require-
ments. A suitablewriting table or workstation is needed at which,
this type of activity can be effectively performed.
A table or workstation is also needed to accommodate maintenance on
items to be disassembled. It should be equipped with some method of
restraining multiple small components during the maintenance task.
BACKGROUND: Writing and managing multiple piece parts in zero g are
difficult chores in that environment. Excessive time is consumed doing
such routine and simple tasks when proper facilities are not available.
The wardroom table did not serve the required purpose because it did
not include the type of restraints needed for books and papers. Also,
the need to prepare and consume food and to clean up afterwards limited
the times when the table was available.
l0
S.L.L. No.: 1-12
TITLE: SPACECRAFTCENTRALSYSTEMTIMINGSOURCE
LESSON LEARNED: The entire spacecraft timing system should have one
central timing source. This source should also be used for all payloads
or kitted items carried by the spacecraft.
BACKGROUND: The entire onboard and downlink system should be keyed to
one central timing source to facilitate data correlation and to minimize
ground data processing complexity. The timing system should be capable
of being updated at any point in time to reflect the true (actual) time.
All onboard experiments that require time tagging should use the common
timing source. The central timing equipment should have sufficient ca-
pacity to extend over the entire mission (run) without "rollover."
S.L.L. No.: 1-13
TITLE: INCREASE 0NBOARD DATA STORAGE CAPABILITY
LESSON LEARNED: Total onboard tape recording time should be increased
to cover at least a normal day's work of experiment activity. This
could be implemented with greater online data storage capacity or by
using the crew to change tapes in some type of simplified cassette system.
Data dump should be accomplished either in parallel with the "workday" or
serially during the sleep period.
BACKGROUND: Flight planning constraints existed because of recorder
nonavailability when two high data generating experiments were planned
back to back. Ground coverage was also a constraint because the exper-
iment data recorders had to be cleared in time for the next run.
S.L.L. No.: 1-14
TITLE: MASS HANDLING AND TRANSFER IN THE SPACECRAFT
LESSON LEARNED: Large masses are easily manageable in zero g. The
real problem is in handling multiple small items without a container to
"fence them in." The limiting factor in handling large masses is the
cross-sectional area, which tends to block the crewman's view of the
transfer path and the terminal site if more than approximately 20 by
25 inches. Energy inputs used to initiate transfer must be removed at
termination, and care must be taken not to "overdo it."
ii
BACKGROUND: No difficulty was encountered by Skylab crews in moving
large masses within the spacecraft. Such items must have provisions
for handling, such as handles or integral parts of structure that can
be easily grasped. Individual techniques for moving items about the
vehicle varied among crewmen, but all adapted well and were quite
successful.
S.L.L. No.: 1-15
TITLE: STANDARDIZATION OF HARDWARE
LESSON LEARNED: Crew-use hardware such as fasteners, electrical and
plumbing connectors, switches, circuit breakers, and screws, etc.,
should be standardized as much as possible to facilitate crew opera-
tions, reduce crew errors, and reduce crew training requirements.
Each common usage also reduces total sparing levels. This approach
will simplify design, documentation, sparing, and actual in-orbit usage.
BACKGROUND: With many different types of devices to manipulate, the
crew will require more extensive training and is more likely to make
errors. These errors could result in lost data, damaged equipment,
or in the worst case, crew hazards. Minimizing the number of different
types of devices will reduce the chance of error and may result in cost
savings by limiting inventory requirements.
S.L.L. No.: 1-16
TITLE: SPECIFICATION REQUIREMENTS FOR BREATHING GASES
LESSON LEARNED: The Skylab 2 gasbreathing system presented the need
for nitrogen, which was controlled, as required, for breathing purposes.
Because mixing of the breathing gas was accomplished in the test
chamber or spacecraft system, no analysis of the mixture was possible
before its use. Therefore, analysis and control of each gas before
system loading were necessary. The NAS_ Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center
(JSC) reviewed the available nitrogen specifications and discovered that
even the most stringent specification (MSFC-SPEC-234A) did not ade-
quately control nonhydrocarbon toxic impurities that must be controlled
in a breathing gas.
BACKGROUND: The MSFC-SPEC-234A has a stringent purity requirement, but
the purity percentage is derived by considering only the controlled
impurities. Because the percentage does not include various nonhydro-
carbon impurities and cleaning solvents (i.e., Freon 113), the presence
of these impurities will not influence the purity rating.
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REFERENCE: The JSC has now prepared the requirements necessary for
control of nitrogen to be used in breathing gas mixtures. These
requirements are reflected in table B of JSC SE-S-0073, Space Shuttle
Fluid Procurement and Use Control. These same requirements will be
documented in the Apollo/Soyuz nitrogen specification.
S.L.L. No.: 1-17
TITLE: HIGH-FIDELITY TRAINING HARDWARE
LESSON LEARNED: High-fidelity training hardware is mandatory to aid in
the development of procedures, to enhance the quality of crew training,
and to ensure efficient use of crew time during flight.
BACKGROUND: The extravehicular pressure control unit (PCU) training
articles assisted the crew in mastering malfunction procedures as well
as in providing them with a better overall systems understanding.
Learning time was significantly reduced. The M509 astronaut maneuvering
experiment simulator at the Martin Marietta Corporation in Denver was a
very effective trainer. No surprises were noted by the crew during
flight and they were able to concentrate on the experiment objectives.
The S063 ultraviolet horizon airglow experiment training was reported
to be inadequate because a simulator could not be devised that would
give the crew an idea of what they would actually see. For some ex-
periments, the first few operations during flight were considered to be
on-the-job training. The intracommunication system used in the one-g
trainers was one of the few systems that had not been designed to
duplicate the flight system. Errors in early checklists resulted because
procedures could never be adequately verified. The training hardware
shortcomings led to reduced effectiveness in crew training.
S.L.L. No.: 1-18
TITLE: MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR DEPOT FOR EXPERIMENT HARDWARE
LESSON LEARNED: Provide a depot repair, maintenance, and modification
capability for delivered experiment hardware. Schedule and manpower
expenditures were minimized because of the quick turnaround capability
afforded by the depot concept of operation and the physical location
of the depot in relation to the receiving and shipping docks. The
ability to repair items in the depot or to go directly to the proper
specialty manufacturing area within the company greatly enhanced the
time it took to achieve needed repairs. The small team of people used
to run the depot were all "graduates" of the qualification-acceptance
test phases (engineering, test, and quality). This fact made the
decision process more accurate and timely. Subsequent repairs and tests
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were accomplished more efficiently because of the experience of the
personnel involved. The depot provided a suitable location for the
mission support testing to assist in the investigation of in-orbit
anomalies during the Skylab missions.
BACKGROUND: The Skylab depot was a dedicated enclosed area located
within the inventory building at the Martin Marietta Corporation
Denver plant. It was equipped with an office area_ receiving/inspection
room, storeroom, and a clean room where all repair and test operations
were done. It was established to support NASA Lyndon B. Johnson Space
Center experiment repairs and modifications.
REFERENCE: Skylab Program - Postdelivery Operations Plan, JSC-03137.
S.L.L. No.: 1-19
TITLE: BENCH TESTING OF COMPLEX ELECTRONIC EXPERIMENT PACKAGES
LESSON LEARNED: The following recommendations apply to complex elec-
tronic experiment packages:
l. Plan a bench test program on a system basis by using development
units and simulators initially, followed by flight units to
provide system compatibility as early as possible.
. Plan to update the development units and simulators on a periodic
basis so that these units can continue to be used in the overall
test program.
. Provide for an off-module bench test capability using development,
qualification, and/or flight backup hardware throughout the entire
test program to provide a means to troubleshoot hardware problems
with a minimum cost and schedule impact to the flight spacecraft.
14. Consider a mobile bench hardware configuration to support special
sensor calibration, testing for end_to_end checkout like the
S192 imagery tests, S191 lunar calibration tests, or S192 low_
frequency noisevacuum test program.
BACKGROUND: The Earth resources experiment package (EREP) provided
for a bench test using development hardware and interface functional
test units before installation and checkout of the flight hardware in
the multiple docking adapter (MDA). These tests were for the purpose
of proving electrical interface and operational compatibility at the
earliest opportunity in the Skylab Program.
Off-module testing of the EREPexperiments and hardware identified many
systems and individual experiment problems without a day-for-day impact
on the MDAflight hardware flow. Most of the problems encountered
were in the individual experiments rather than in the interface with the
MDA. The bench test setup was helpful in resolving anomalies discovered
in flight.
•S.L.L. No.: 1-20
TITLE: SPECIALPROCEDURESFORHANDLINGMAGNETICTAPE
LESSON LEARNED: To prepare and protect magnetic tape for maximum
accuracy of high-density digital data storage, the following special
procedures were found necessary and adequate:
iI
Magnetic tape was screened by using the same high bit-packing
density and track density as the flight data and checked for bit
error rate before acceptance.
.
Flight-screened tapes were specially wound by using a progrsmed
winding technique that varied the tape tension to be lower at the
beginning and end of the winding process to provide an inverted
cup-shaped general tape tension profile. This winding process
enabled the wound tape reels to withstand a relatively severe
launch vibration and shock profile over a temperature from 50°
to ii0 ° F. Tape reels that were not programed wound exhibited
block shifts and other tape damage that reduced the accuracy of
the data in the areas affected.
BACKGROUND: The physical and chemical changes experienced by magnetic
tape resulting from exposure to environment extremes are not well known.
Normally, this type information is considered as proprietary by magnetic
tape manufacturers. The concern from a data acquisition/recovery stand-
point is the bit error rate impact resulting from actual tape damage
or degradation due to the chemical and physical changes. Results of
many magnetic tape-winding tension profile evaluations show that the
tension-winding programs developed for Skylab substantially reduced the
susceptibility of the tape to handling damage. Skylab experience showed
that one of the primary limitations on recording system bit error rate
is the .quality of the magnetic tape. To determine the magnetic tape
bit error limitations, each flight/ground test tape was bit error
screened on each of 28 tracks throughout the full tape length to a
conservative bit error specification.
REFERENCES: JSC-03143, Development Test Report for EREP Tape Recorder;
JSC-05352, Test Report for EREP Magnetic Tape Evaluation Test Program.
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S.L.L. No.: 1-21
TITLE: DETERMINATION OF EQUIPMENT QUANTITIES
LESSON LEARNED: Individual hardware suppliers should not independently
establish hardware quantities required for program activities. The
program organization must establish a consistent approach in determining
quantities of equipment required to support a program. A combination
events chart and requirements checklist was a useful tool for quantity
determination.
BACKGROUND: On Skylab, technical monitors and suppliers did not have
sufficient information to determine accurate quantity data such as
how many carbon monoxide monitors, television cameras, or clothing
modules were to be required to support all ground and flight activity.
The project office devised a combination events chart and requirements
checklist that assured that enough items would be available and mini-
mized production of unnecessary items. The key factors affecting
quantity are breadboard, mockup, prototype, qualification, production
for flight, flight backup, trainers, and spare parts. Timing is also
important in sequencing usage to reduce total quantities required.
S.L.L. No.: 1-22
TITLE: SHORTEN FLIGHT DATA RETRIEVAL RESPONSE TIME
LESSON LEARNED: Flight data retrieval should be better automated and
should be available within a shorter response time.
BACKGROUND: On Skylab, too many man-hours were expended for flight data
retrieval. Because science data must be retrieved by someone familiar
with the data to ensure proper downstream data handling, the data re-
triever must be well trained in the experiment and must have a thorough
understanding of the ground and onboard data system.
S.L.L. No.: 1-23
TITLE: CRITICALITY CATEGORIES AND HAZARD CATEGORIES
LESSON LEARNED: Criticality categories for single failure points and
hazard categories should be uniform for all contractors and all hardware.
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BACKGROUND: Differences in definitions and application of criticality
categories and hazard categories caused confusion and created problems
in preparing hazard analyses and single-failure point summaries.
REFERENCE: 0MSF SPD #1A for hazard categories.
S.L.L. No.: 1-24
TITLE: TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS FOR EXPERIMENTS OR GOVERNMENT
FURNISHED EQUIPMENT
LESSON LEARNED: The minimum number of key operating parameters should _
be specified in technical specifications. If a specification is
written with all performance parameters identified with tight toler-
ances, the danger is that the learning process associated with a devel-
opment of a new concept will involve many potential violations of the
contractual specification. It may be that the new concept or approach
deletes the need for many of the tolerances or even some of the speci-
fied parameters. Where new technology is to be permitted in a proposal,
the tendency should be to write the performance specification in terms
of only the key parameters. Detailed component operating characteris-
tics and tolerances should be established later through NASA-approved
contractor specifications.
BACKGROUND: When the astronaut life support assembly end-item speai-
fication was being written, it was realized that there were two methods
of providing pressure control and flow rate to the extravehicular
mobility unit. One method had been used during the Gemini and Apollo
Programs. Another method involved upstream regulation and downstream
flow control. To afford bidders the opportunity to present the widest
spectrum of potential design, the end-item specification, written at
the NASA Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center, allowed for both approaches.
(However, there was an additional ground rule that only proven hard-
ware or designs could be used.) Although the generation of the
specification was done with the best available technical input, the
tolerances were later found to be more stringent than necessary.
S.L.L. No.: 1-25
TITLE: OPERATIONS DOCUMENTATION REDUNDANCY
LESSON LEARNED: Mission documentation should be consolidated and should
have little or no overlap. Conflicts develop quite frequently when two
or more control documents cover the same items.
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BACKGROUND: Both Skylab Mission Rules and the Mission Requirements
Documents (MED) included instructions relative to experiment constraints.
Because the MRD had wider program authority, it should have been the
control document. The constraints should have been written in the MRD
in a format that was compatible with the Mission Rules. During Skylab,
MRD updates were shown on Flight Operations Management Room forms and
had visibility long before Mission Rules were considered.
The operations handbooks and the crew checklists also overlapped. These
documents should be combined and should be written by the same individ-
uals.
The Operations Data Book items should be combined with the systems hand-
books so that hardware performance and operations are all contained under
one cover.
TITLE: ACCURACY REQUIREMENTS FOR EPHEMERIS DATA
S.L.L. No.: 1-26
LESSON LEARNED: In the development of requirements for various data-base
ephemerides in future planning applications, accuracy requirements for
both real-time and postmission analysis should be an integral part of
the documentation.
BACKGROUND: Planning systems, such as the mission operations planning
system (MOPS), have many diverse users. Each user has certain minimum
accuracy requirements for the ephemeris he is accessing. For Skylab,
these requirements were never documented, which made the task of main-
taining the trajectory very subjective. Because maintenance of these
various trajectories is simply a service function, the absence of firm
accuracy requirements makes it impossible to establish a definite prior-
ity on these updates. Certain long-range planning functions required
essentially no accuracy while detailed real-time work like Earth re-
sources experiment planning necessitated extremely accurate trajectory
data. While MOPS updates in Skylab were more than adequate to meet all
user requirements, more widely used systems in the future must be
maintained by using positive standards with which to justify updates.
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S.L.L. No.: 1-27
TITLE: PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR BATCH-TYPE SOFTWARE SUPPORT
LESSON LEARNED: A software approach that allows quick software develop-
ment by the Principal Investigator (PI) should be provided. The software
support system should be built with the following considerations:
i. Detailed software documentation should not be required of the PI.
He or one of his programing representatives should be available
any time his software is run operationally.
2. Data input routines should be standardized and provided by NASA with
appropriate controls to protect the input data.
3. Data output devices and display packages should be standardized as
much as possible.
o
Investigators should be provided with a software manual, which de-
scribes the standard NASA systems, inputs, outputs, and general
purpose software units (i.e., statistics routines) that are avail-
able to the user on request.
BACKGROUND: The lead time requirement levied on Skylab PI's for software
development was not reasonable from a scientific point of view. The
software implementors wanted detailed software requirements developed at
least 2 years before flight. Many Pl's did not yet have operational
hardware at the time and experiment protocols were still undefined. The
type of system proposed would be similar to normal batch-type operations
so that production activity could continue in a normal manner from mis-
sion operations to job shop.
S.L.L. No.: 1-28
TITLE: TRANSCRIPT LIBRARIES FOR RECORDED VOICE AND AIR-TO-GROUND VOICE
DATA
LESSON LEARNED: The transcript library function was very useful and
brought order out of chaos. This type of capability should be used
and expanded in future missions to include documentation filing.
BACKGROUND: Transcripts are _ necessary. Voice tapes cannot be readily
reviewed by all personnel at one time. The cataloging task performed
by the transcript library was very helpful.
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S.L.Lo No.: 1-29
TITLE: DATAPROCESSINGRESPONSETIMESFORMISSIONCONTROLCENTER
LESSON LEARNED: An integral part of building a software system for the
Mission Control Center (MCC) must be to ensure that adequate response
time is provided for all computations. In some mission phases, the
strictest requirements on response time may dictate processing prior-
ities inconsistent with mission operations in other phases of flight.
Further, all software requirements should indicate specific response
times required, when applicable.
BACKGROUND: In Skylab, telemetry processing was given a higher priority
than trajectory processing because, generally, telemetry processing was
considered more important. In some mission phases, however, time
critical trajectory computations were mandatory for crew safety and
mission success, and these computations were held out an unacceptable
length of time because of telemetry processing. Although a workable
arrangement was finally realized by stripping down extraneous processing
to a minimum (and several other compromises), a permanent fix was not
implemented.
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TITLE :
S.L.L. No.:
CAPABILITY FOR EXTRAVEHICULAR ACTIVITY ACCESS, PATHS, AND
HANDHOLDS
2-1
LESSON LEARNED: Extravehicular activity (EVA) access should allow the
crew to go to any point on the exterior of the spacecraft. Paths
should be established and handholdsprovided such that the crew can
traverse to any point on the exterior of the spacecraft. If fixed
restraints are not feasible, alternate design concepts should be
considered.
BACKGROUND: Skylab EVA paths were limited by the 60-foot length of
the EVA umbilicals and, in some cases, by the lack of handholds.
Universal EVA foot restraints were designed for use on the later Skylab
missions.
S.L.L. No.: 2-2
TITLE: EXTRAVEHICULAR ACTIVITY AND SPACE VEHICLE DESIGN COMPATIBILITY
LESSON LEARNED: Space vehicle design, from mission conception, should
accommodate extravehicular activity (EVA) as a planned normal operation;
that is:
1. The airlock should not be located in the center of the vehicle be-
tween habitable areas.
2. The airlock should be large enough to accommodate two suited crew-
men and an assortment of hardware.
3. Electrical and television outlets should be provided external to
the vehicle.
4. Adequate restraints, handholds, etc., should be provided inside the
airlock.
BACKGRDUND: The location of the airlock module precluded access to the
orbital workshop (OWS) during Skylab EVA. This situation was not a
major problem for Skylab, but it was recognized as a basic design limi-
tation. The equipment needed for EVA had to be moved into the airlock
module or multiple docking adapter (MDA) before EVA. As early as
1967, the basic Skylab design with the airlock in the center was recog-
nized as undesirable. However, because of other program constraints,
no action was taken to relocate the EVA airlock.
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S.L.L. No.: 2-3
TITLE: EXTRAVEHICULAR MOBILITY UNIT/EXTRAVEHICULAR ACTIVITY LIFE-
SUPPORT HARDWARE DESIGN
LESSON LEARNED: Future extravehicular mobility unit (EMU)/extravehicular
activity (EVA) life-support hardware should stress small self-contained
modular rechargeable units as opposed to umbilical designs.
BACKGROUND: Numerous instances of umbilical management problems occurred
during each Skylab EVA, especially those for which the crew had received
minimal or no one-g training. Because of the required handling associated
with an umbilical system (i.e., unstowing, stowing, untangling from
Structur@_ and EVA crewman, managing for a transferring crewman, keeping
out of work area, preventing damage to experiments, etc.), a small
amount of overhead must always be added to an umbilical-supported EVA
which, if not a constraint, is at least a nuisance that distracts from
the EVA task. This is in addition to the limited radius of operation
afforded by a fixed-length umbilical system.
S.L.L. No.: 2-4
TITLE: SPACE SUIT AND FABRIC DRYING
LESSON LEARNED: The space suits dried very rapidly in the orbital
workshop (0WS) drying stations, without accumulating objectionable odor
as had been expected. Suit drying and stowage in the cabin atmosphere
was an acceptable procedure. Towels, washcloths, and damp clothes also
dried very rapidly in the low humidity of the 0WS. The towel holders
worked well, but all corners of the item being dried had to be
restrained so that the item didnot extend into the work areas.
TITLE: WASTE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM DESIGN FEATURES
S.L.L. No.: 2-5
LESSON LEARNED: The airflow system for collecting feces and urine
worked well for Skylab; thus, this concept is recommended for future
spacecraft. For fecal collection, higher airflow than that used on
the Skylab system would be desirable. The seat should be fabricated
of a softer material, and the outside diameter should be widened to
provide a better airflow seal. The lap belt and handholds were abso-
lutely required. The urine collection system should provide for a
volume of at least 4000 ml/man/day. The urine separator should not be
as noisy as the one used on Skylab. The cuff system for collecting
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urine was satisfactory as a contingency mode. The urine collector
should be refrigerated or stored in a sealed condition to prevent odor
buildup. The waste managementcompartmentshould be located suffi-
ciently far from the sleep compartmentto minimize noise disturbance
to sleeping crewmembers. The sameblower design was used for the
fecal collector, the shower, and the vacuumcleaner on Skylab. This
commonality simplified design and maintenance and reduced costs. The
in-orbit hand washer that consisted of a water dispenser and cloth
squeezer was satisfactory. An enclosed design permitting the crewman
to actually wash with the water rather than having to soak up everything
in a washcloth would be desiraNle.
S.L.L. No.: 2-6
TITLE: ONBOARDSTOWAGED SIGN
LESSON LEARNED: Designers of onboard stowage facilities for future
spacecraft should consider the following:
i. Individual food stowage items should be located conveniently near
the crewman's place in the wardroom.
e Spacecraft control panel numbers and stowage location numbers were
often confusing because they were similar (both used form such as
F586). Control panel identification numbers should be created
in a format different from that used for stowage location numbers.
.
5.
.
Standard stowage lockers and locker doors should be used wherever
possible. A standard hole pattern for attaching hardware on the
door was very useful.
To provide two-hand access to the inside of the lockers, locker
doors should have sufficient friction in the hinges to hold the
doors in the open position.
Specialized stowage restraints, cushions, filler material, and
separators were found not to be required. Clothing items, towels,
and other compressible soft goods were substituted for packing
material with substantial cost and weight saving.
The capability for rapid assessment of additions, deletions, and
changes in equipment stowage should be provided, using mockups,
trainers, and simulated lockers.
7. Stowage interface control documents and installation drawings
should be required only when there are critical interfaces.
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8. Stowage configuration was documented quickly and effectively in
photographs.
BACKGROUND: With the Skylab wardroom design, when all three crewman
were eating, the crewman seated in front of the pantry had to move out
of the way while the other crewmembers unstowed their food from the
pantry. Stowage of each crewman's food directly behind his position
at the wardroom table would have alleviated this problem.
Weight and volume were very much in demand in the Skylab 2, 3, and 4
command modules. Substantial stowed equipment was added to the space-
craft when towels and clothing were used for padding instead of
customized cushions and restraint straps. Frequent last-minute changes
to the stowage configuration dictated a quick response method for
documenting the configuration. Photography served this purpose well.
S.L.L. No.: 2-7
TITLE: USE OF CLOSED CELL FOAM MATERIAL FOR LAUNCH STOWAGE RESTRAINTS
LESSON LEARNED: Closed cell material used for stowage restraints
should have an allowable tolerance to account for changes in volume
at different pressures.
BACKGROUND: A problem was identified with mosites foam swelling and
shrinking at certain pressures. Because of this phenomenon, the
various configurations for which the mosite was initially used resulted
in the following conditions:
i. At 26 psia, sample specimens showed a 23-percent decrease in
thickness. If this material were fitted for use as a cushioning
spacer for hardware under standard atmospheric conditions, its
effectiveness at higher pressure levels would be seriously impaired.
. At 5 psia, representative specimens showed a 5-percent increase
in thickness. Thus, standard atmospheric designs for cushioning
hardware would "lipover," making it more difficult to remove the
supported object.
REFERENCE: MMC letter 72Y-74,246, 21 Aug., 1972. Subject: Contract
NAS 8-24000, N_C-145, Plan for Resolution of the Mosites Foam Swelling/
Shrinking Problem.
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S.L.L. No.: 2-8
TITLE: SPACECRAF_ ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS DESIGN
LESSON LEARNED: Electrical power sharing of the orbital workshop and
the Apollo telescope mount proved to be invaluable. Future spacecraft
electrical systems should have the capability of switching the available
power from major modules or sources to where they will do the most good.
Use of common connectors and good access redundancy on power systems
are required.
BACKGOUND: The loss of one of the Skylab solar arrays at launch led to
critical electrical power situations that were solved by sharing the
available electrical power among several spacecraft modules. Subsequent
failures in orbit were handled by adjustments in shared power
distribution.
S.L.L. No.: 2-9
TITLE: DESIGNING TO DETECT TRANSIENTS IN SPACECRAFT POWER SYSTEMS
LESSON LEARNED: Electrical power systems should be instrumented to
provide sample rates high enough to detect transients. When selecting
telemetry measurement points and the rate of transmission, consideration
should be given to how the data will be used to analyze a problem.
BACKGOUND: When S055 hardware experienced a power transient, the main
bus current could only be analyzed at i sample/second in near real time.
Experiment bus parameters were not included on the auxiliary storage
and playback recorder.
S.L.L. No.: 2-10
TITLE: SPACECRAFT TELEMETRY DESIGN
LESSON LEARNED: Systems data should be taken from points that provide
a direct indication of the function being monitored_
BACKGROUND: The aperture door telemetry parameters on the Apollo tele-
scope mount were derived from relays that changed state as a function
of the command but not as the door opened or closed. Consequently,
the telemetry did not provide a credible indication of door position.
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S.L.L. No.: 2-ii
TITLE : SPACECRAFT SYSTEM FAILURE DETECTION SEQUENCE CONTROL
LESSON LEARNED: Where spacecraft system redundancy management schemes
cycle automatically from multiple to single sensor configurations, the
capability must exist to enable/inhibit the redundancy management func-
tion at discrete points in the failure isolation sequence as well as to
enable/inhibit the function in general.
BACKGROUND: Skylab rate gyro redundancy management monitored three
rate gyros for failure indications. If redundancy management detected
a faulty gyro in control, that gyro was disregarded and the system was
reconfigured for control of the two remaining gyros. If an additional
failure was detected, single gyro control was selected. A "reasonable-
ness" test was incorporated to determine the operating status of the
remaining gyro, and failure to pass this test resulted in no attitude
reference about the affected axis. The redundancy management scheme
then automatically configured to "attitude hold" in the two remaining
axes.
This scheme, like most redundancy management schemes, was subject to
error, especially when the system was subjected to large disturbance
torques. For this reason, rate gyro redundancy management was inhibited
on many occasions when a specific attitude control mode was required.
This action was taken to preclude the system from automatically changing
modes to "attitude hold." If a selective enable/inhibit function had
existed, the single gyro failure isolation could have been bypassed
while still retaining the automatic redundancy management for the three-
and two-gyro configurations.
S.L.L. No.: 2-12
TITLE: SPACECRAFT SYSTEM HEATER MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL
LESSON LEARNED: If heaters are provided to maintain a spacecraft sys-
tem in a desired temperature range, a backup manual control capability
should be provided. To facilitate this manual control, the heater
should be undersized. (That is, it should have a much longer "on" cycle
than "off.") The failure mode for the automatic heater control should
be fail safe (fail off).
BACKGROUND: Skylab rate gyros had many problems associated with failed
"on" heaters. If heater enable/inhibit functions had been provided, it
would have been possible to manually maintain the temperature in the
desired range and keep the system operational.
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On the control moment gyro system, the ground heater management function
had to be used extensively. However, the task was greatly complicated
by the short heater "on" times required. Special care was required to
preclude the temperature exceeding the automatic shutoff upper limit or
manual control would have been lost for at least one automatic cycle.
If the heaters had been undersized, the "on" cycle would have been
longer and operational management less difficult.
S.L.L. No.: 2-13
TITLE: BACKUP SYSTEMS
LESSON LEARNED: Where primary systems are untried or overly complex,
the backup system should be different and simpler in design to provide
"true" redundancy.
BACKGROUND: Skylab came very close to losing all rate gyros in a single
axis because of generic design problems with the gyros. If there had
been some kind of simplified backup system to allow degraded perform-
ance, this failure could have been tolerated without the risk of mission
termination.
S.L.L. No.: 2-14
TITLE: SPACECRAFT ATTITUDE MANEUVER STORAGE REQUIREMENTS
LESSON LEARNED: The onboard computer should have the capability for
storing a series of attitude maneuvers and their times of execution.
BACKGROUND: The capability to load a series of attitude maneuvers would
relieve the crewman of the time-critical task of loading maneuvers in-
dividually and would allow concentration on the preparation and execu-
tion of other activities.
S.L.L. No.: 2-15
TITLE: PRIVATE AIR-T0-GROUND COMMUNICATIONS
LESSON LEARNED: Private air-to-ground (A/G) communications should not
require reconfiguration of the spacecraft and ground operational A/G
system but should be included as a mode of operation designed into the
spacecraft and ground systems. Additionally, scrambling should be con-
sidered to ensure privacy.
3O
BACKGROUND: The Skylab private A/G capability required reconfiguration
of both the spacecraft and the ground systems. On several occasions,
this resulted in out-of-configuration problems and the loss of scheduled
communications, private conversations to be recorded, and/or the release
of private A/G voice at ground facilities. In essence, if private A/G
communication is to be implemented, it should not be dependent on multi-
ple work-around procedures that are subject to operator errors.
S.L.L. No.: 2-16
TITLE: CAPABILITY TO CHANGE ONBOARD CRITICAL LIMITS
LESSON LEARNED: The capability to change critical limits for the cau-
tion and warning system should be provided to compensate for unantici-
pated variations in the orbital environment.
BACKGROUND: During Skylab, it was necessary to inhibit certain caution
and warning inputs because of temperature and pressure changes associat-
ed with Beta angle deviations. This bypassed all limit sensing of the
inhibited parameters until they returned to the premission limits.
S.L.L, No.: 2-17
TITLE: MANUAL ENTRY DEVICES FOR SPACECRAFT COMPUTER
LESSON LEARNED: Manual entry devices for the spacecraft computer should
permit the crewman to view each digit as it is entered rather than show-
ing only the completed entry. Editing capability for the inputs is
desirable.
BACKGROUND: Editing capability Would facilitate making accurate entries
into the computer.
S.L.L. No.: 2-18
TITLE: ATTITUDE SENSOR UPDATES TO SPACECRAFT COMPUTER
LESSON LEARNED: The capability should be provided to inhibit attitude
sensors frc_ updating the computer when either hardware malfunctions
or special procedures cause such updates to be undesirable.
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BACKGROUND: On Skylab, updates to the computer by the star tracker were
sometimes incorrect. Attitude updates by the acquisition Sun sensors
were not always desirable during certain maneuvers.
S.L.L. No.: 2-19
TITLE: LOADING MEMORY OF SPACECRAFT BACKUP COMPUTER
LESSON LEARNED: The capability should be provided to update and monitor
the backup computer without bringing it on line for control.
BACKGROUND: Without the capability to update the backup spacecraft com-
puters, they cannot be kept in an updated configuration with the latest
flight program. On Skylab, a switchover to the backup Apollo telescope
mount computer required immediate program updates to bring it up to the
flight configuration. The capability to monitor the off-line computer
without bringing it on line would permit knowing the condition of the
backup capability at all times.
S.L.L. No.: 2-20
TITLE: VISUAL AT21TUDE REFERENCE
LESSON LEARNED: A visual attitude reference independent of the control
system displays should be provided in manned spacecraft.
BACKGROUND: The loss of the star tracker on Skylab resulted in loss of
the Z-axis attitude determination capability. No "out the window" clues
were provided to aid the crew in making this determination. As a result,
the crew could not position the Skylab in the correct Z-axis attitude
without instructions from the ground.
S.L.L. No.: 2-21
TITLE: 0NBO_ED SYSTEMS DATA RECORDING
LESSON LEARNED: Onboard data recording systems should include suffi-
cient data to adequately determine the cause of out-of-coverage failures.
BACKGROUND: Skylab data recorders contained only a bare minimum of
systems data. The sample rate of these parameters that were recorded
was too slow for detailed troubleshooting (i.e., i sample/4 sec
for computer data). The flight controllers were often handicapped by
lack of information on failuresthat occurred while the vehicle was out
of contact with ground stations.
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S.L.L. No.: 2-22
TITLE: SOFTWAREUPDATECAPABILITY
LESSON LEARNED: The capability should exist to incorporate software
modifications into all spacecraft onboard computers simultaneously
as well as selectively to a specified computer or set of computers.
BACKGROUND: On Skylab, software patches could only be made to the space-
craft online computer. If a switchover occurred to the backup computer,
it was necessary to make multiple software patches to bring the "new"
computer up to date.
S.L.L. No.: 2-23
TITLE: RECOGNITION OF GROUND/CREW INTERFACES IN SYSTEMS DESIGN
LESSON LEARNED: Ensure that spacecraft systems design is such that rou-
tine ground activities do not force interruption of the crew activities.
BACKGROUND: Even with voice warning calls from the ground, routine
dumping of the voice recorder caused frequent interruption activities
and sometimes resulted in loss of data.
S.L.L. No.: 2-24
TITLE: OVERRIDE OVER AUTOMATIC VALVES
LESSON LEARNED: Consideration should be given to providing either me-
chanical or electrical override capability for all valves that operate
automatically. The capability to place a valve in a desired position
or to manipulate a stuck valve should be provided.
BACKGROUND: A double failure was experienced in the airlock module cool-
ant loops and refrigeration systems. The temperature control valve B
in both the primary and secondary airlock module coolant loops stuck
and the radiator bypass control valve stuck in the primary and secondary
refrigeration systems. In both cases, had manual control over these
valves been provided, the crew Could have adjusted the valves to an op-
timum operating range, thus regaining full systems capability.
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S.L.L. No.: 2-25
TITLE: LOCATINGTEMPERATURETRANSDUCERSONFLUIDLINES
LESSON LEARNED: Local hot or cold spots can occur within fluid lines in
a spacecraft in orbit when there is no fluid mixing or convection to
supplement the normal conduction mode of heat transfer. This condition
should be considered in choosing the locations of control or monitoring
transducers.
BACKGROUND: During the Skylab 4 mission, the monitoring measurements
on the command and service module (CSM) service propulsion system (SPS)
oxidizer line indicated erroneous local temperatures rather than the
mixed-mean temperature or the maximum temperature of the oxidizer being
heated by a strip heater located diametrically opposite the temperature
transducers on the oxidizer feedline.
S.L.L. No.: 2-26
TITLE: SINGLE-MEMORY READOUTS FROM SPACECRAFT COMPUTER
LESSON LEARNED: Telemetered single-memory readouts selectable from the
ground are useful to the ground in determining the onboard computer load
at a given address when large memory dumps are impractical.
BACKGROUND: Such readouts would be helpful in solving unforeseen prob-
lems, provided the command capability exists to address any location
of interest.
S.L.L. No.: 2-27
TITLE: EXPERIMENT/SPACECRAFT DESIGN COMPATIBILITY
LESSON LEARNED: The performance of a given experiment should be as in-
dependent of the spacecraft as possible. The day-to-day activities in
the spacecraft should not be severely restricted because of various
operation constraints of the experiment.
BACKGROUND: Because of the unique requirements and operating con-
straints of some of the corollary experiments, other on-going activities
in the Skylab workshop had to be curtailed or altered. Accordingly,
flight planning for those experiments was often limited to minimum lev-
els; the crew's efficiency was reduced while other experiments were
perturbed.
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S.L.L. No.: 2-28
TITLE: UNATTENDED OPERATION OF EXPERIMENT HARDWARE
LESSON LEARNED: In designing experiment hardware, consideration should
be given to unattended operation requiring only an initiation command.
If the experiment can be operated unattended, the crewman is freed for
other tasks, additional time becomes available for experiment opera-
tions, and flight planning is simplified. Cojnmands to control the
experiment could be initiated by either the ground, an onboard computer,
or by automatic sequence within the experiment itself.
BACKGROUND: As a general rule, if the performance of a given experi-
ment required the full-time support and attention of the crewman to
satisfy its data-gathering requirements, it resulted in inefficient
use of crew time, undesirable flight-planning constraints, loss of ex-
periment operation during sleep periods, etc.
S.L.L_ No.: 2-29
TITLE: TIME CORRELATION OF VIDEO RECORDER DATA
LESSON LEARNED: Spacecraft video recorders should have the capability
to "time tag" data that are dependent on the time at which they were
recorded.
BACKGROUND: It was extremely difficult to determine when many Apollo
telescope mount sequences were recorded on the video tape recorder.
The only sequence indicator available was the time the tape was dumped
to the Spaceflight Tracking and Data Network. Lack of timing informa-
tion for the events recorded decreased the value of the video as scien-
tific and planning data.
S.L.L. No.: 2-30
TITLE: FOOD RECONSTITUTION SYSTEM
LESSON LEARNED: Additional design effort is needed in the food rehy-
dration area to further reduce the problem of entrapped gas.
BACKGROUND: The metering dispensers for hot and cold reconstitution
water for food items contained entrapped or dissolved gas. This
entrapped gas made reconstitution difficult. Although this problem
was recognized during ground-based testing and observed in previous
35
flights, it still occurred. The gas, in addition to making reconsti-
tution difficult, inflated the food package to a volume larger than
that of the nominal design. As a result, heating of the food in the
food tray was sometimesinadequate.
S.L.L. No.: 2-31
TITLE: FOODSYSTEMSTORAGELOCKERS
LESSON LEARNED: Realistic dimension tolerances should be standardized
on large volume food system storage lockers to minimize interface
problems, shimming, and test requirements.
BACKGROUND: The storage volume for the food system in the spacecraft
was defined early in the program cycle, allowing the food lockers to
be built with poor tolerance control, which resulted in ll different
sizes for the lldifferent lockers. Maximum tolerance buildup in each
direction could exceed 0.5 inch. The loaded food restraint assemblies
were to fit all lockers. These restraint assemblies were quite massive
and, once in orbit, were required to be removed by the crew. The use
of shims was unsuitable because_the odd shapes (wedges) of the lockers
would not allow shims and/or the inserts to be removed after inserting
the food restraint assemblies in the lockers. As a result, internal
damping techniques inside the canisters, cans, and restraint assembly
were used to provide the vibration isolation required to protect the
food. Extra development and testing were required to qualify the
system.
S.L.L. No.: 2-32
TITLE: GROUND-TO-AIR COMMUNICATION yERIFICATION
LESSON LEARNED: A system for verifying onboard receipt of teleprinter
messages is needed, as well as a scheme for managing the large quan-
tities of onboard data received by teleprinter.
BACKGROUND: From time to time, a Skylab crewman would omit a task or
perform one improperly because he had not received a message or had
received one that was in error. Being greeted with a 10-foot-long
series of messages from the teleprinter each morning and having to
distribute as well as keep track of them through the day (or for
several days) was a continuing problem.
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Missions with open-ended workdays of great operational and experimental
flexibility must necessarily interchange extensive amounts of informa-
tion between the ground and the spacecraft. With limited station
coverage for voice communications, the teleprinter in Skylab was
mandatory.
S.L.L. No.: 2-33
TITLE: INTRAVEHICULAR ACTIVITY COMMUNICATION
LESSON LEARNED: Designers of future spacecraft communications systems
should consider the following:
i. Speaker box placement and acoustical design should minimize speaker-
to-microphone coupling.
2. Electronic gain changes resulting from signal level changes (auto-
matic gain control (AGC) action) should be minimized.
3. Provision should be made for circuitry to disable speakers that
could couple into a microphone whenever the microphone is keyed.
BACKGROUND: Skylab crewmen could not communicate effectively in the
5 psia atmosphere for distances exceeding 15 or 20 feet. The intercom
box squeal and feedback problem kept crewmen busy adjusting boxes;
some were finally turned off. The Skylab workshop audio system had
13 speaker intercom boxes. Only the speaker in the box with a keyed
microphone was muted.
The Skylab 2 and 3 crews complained of extreme sensitivity to feedback
and inability to adjust for an adequate uplink (received) volume level
without being susceptible to audio feedback oscillation when a micro-
phone was keyed for spacecraft-to-ground communication. For Skylab 4,
a plug-in attenuator network was provided to optimize the intercom
system electronic gain and to limit the AGC action.
S.L.L. No.: 2-34
TITLE: UNUSABLE VOLUME CLOSEOUTS
LESSON LEARNED: Closeouts around permanently installed hardware elim-
inated nooks and crannies into which loose items could disappear.
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BACKGROUND: Skylab crewmen reported that the closeouts in the multiple
docking adapter were helpful in keeping equipment from floating under
equipment racks or behind control panels. These closeouts appear
desirable when they can be provided without major impact.
S.L.L. No.: 2-35
TITLE: ACCUMULATION OF LOOSE ITEMS ON RETURN AIR VENTS
LESSON LEARNED: Virtually all loose debris (solid or liquid) in the
orbital workshop migrated to the air mixing chamber screens in the
dome. This phenomenon should be exploited in future designs by
strategically locating the environmental return air vents and planning
to collect loose items there. They should be easily cleanable or
should have replaceable filters.
BACKGROUND: Skylab crewmen reported numerous instances in which lost
items were.found adhering to the screens. Conceivably, this feature
could also be used for securing small items at workstations.
S.L.L. No.: 2-36
TITLE: NEED FOR SIMPLE IN-0RBIT RESTRAINTS FOR LOOSE EQUIPMENT
LESSON LEARNED: Many of the orbital workshop equipment restraints
appeared to be oversized. Simpler concepts would have probably saved
cost, weight, complexity, and crew time.
Operational equipment restraints should be standardized and should be
simple and easy to use. Bungee-type restraints attached to stowage
lockers, walls, doors, etc., would be adequate for many of the in-
orbit equipment stowage and handling activities. Specific book
restraints are needed at work sites to retain checklists and to keep
them open to a given page. If a press-fit restraint is used for loose
hardware, care must be taken not to insert the hardware too deeply or
too tightly into the retention device. A specific means for keeping
clothing spread out to dry while the crew sleeps would be desirable.
BACKGROUND: Massive launch restraint systems were used for some of the
larger equipment items, and although they may have been necessary for
launch, they were cumbersome to operate repeatedly in orbit. Some of
the smaller equipment items were protected so well that they were
almost inaccessible on short notice. For example, flashlights were
packaged in individual Beta cloth bags inside an overbag, which was
stored in a compartment within a stowagelocker. Temporary stowage
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capabilities are needed at use or interim locations to eliminate the
need for returning items to their launch stowage containers. Most
operational and experimental equipment requires an accompanying
checklist, which necessitates the use of one hand if no checklist
restraint is available.
S.L.L. No.: 2-37
TITLE: INTRAVEHICULARACTIVITY MOBILITY IN SPACECRAFT
LESSON LEARNED: Intravehicular activity architectural layout should
ensure that normal translation routes do not interfere with the
working, eating, sleeping, or relaxing crewmen. The critical point
along a crewman's translation path is where he either changes direction
or negotiates an opening such as a hatch. Attitude excursions are
inherent at these Junctures, and the lower extremities are constantly
bumped on thresholds and hardware protruding around doorways. A
buffer zone to minimize bumping should be used adjacent to all openings,
and the immediate areas should be kept clear of protruding hardware.
In smaller compartments, like the crew quarters, the crew tended to
position themselves perpendicular to the floor for normal activities
and translation. This made the conventional arrangement of floor,
ceiling, and lights useful. In large compartments, like the forward
orbital workshop (OWS) dome area, the crew tended to translate head-
first, because the walls and floor were not an imfluence.
BACKGROUND: The pilot's position at the wardroom table was such that
to exit the wardroom he had to translate over the table or have another
crewman move from his position to allow passage. Both methods were
inconvenient, but passage over the table was also a hazard from the
"foot-in-the-food-tray" point of view. Skylab crewmen impacted the
OWS dome sufficiently en route to the dome hatch to leave dents in the
ceiling. The crewmembers often bruised their legs as a result of
multiple hatch negotiations and immediate attitude reorientations
during the day.
In the crew quarters, the location of lighting onthe ceiling and most
equipment on the floor caused the crew to use a position perpendicular
to the floor for translation and most activities. This tendency was
reinforced by the availability of foot restraints on the floor. In the
larger compartment, the crew did not adhere to the position perpendic-
ular to the floor as much. They generally chose to move headfirst
from one wall to another. Hencethe compartment size and layout
governed the preferred body orientation.
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S.L.L. No.: 2-38
TITLE: USE OF SPACE IN HABITABLE COMPARTMENTS
LESSON LEARNED: Use of space in the smaller habitable compartments was
very similar to use of space in Earth gravity. Overhead space was not
particularly useful in orbit despite the increased ease of access.
BACKGROUND: It was expected that habitable compartment volume would be
used more efficiently in zero-g space stations, because the space
above one's head, which is of little use in Earth-based compartments,
would be more useful in zero gravity. Possibly because of the partic-
ular architectural arrangement of the Skylab crew quarters, the crews
were not inclined to use the space above tables and consoles or any
space above their shoulder level when operating on the lower deck of
the orbital workstation.
S.L.L. No.: 2-39
TITLE: HABITABLE ENVIRONMENT
LESSON LEARNED: The Skylab "comfort box" was acceptable. Temperature
was comfortable, humidity was a bit low, acoustic environment was
pleasant, and odors were virtually nonexistent. Portable fans are
desirable. Individual thermal controls for sleep and waste management
compartments would also be desirable.
BACKGROUND: Chapped lips, dry skin, and nasal discomfort were attri-
buted to the low humidity experienced by the Skylab crews. Portable
fans helped to relieve heat layers created by exercise and not dis-
persed by convection. Separate thermal controls for the waste manage-
ment compartment would have allowed more comfortable bathing.
S.L.L. No.: 2-40
TITLE: HABITABILITY ILLUMINATION
LESSON LEARNED: The general lighting levels provided throughout the
Skylab orbital assembly were marginally low but acceptable.
BACKGROUND: Subjective evaluations of the lighting levels provided in
Skylab varied considerably among the crews of Skylab 2, 3, and 4.
Skylab 2 and 3 crewmen frequently complained of insufficient illumina-
tion. Frequent use of a flashlight for supplemental lighting was
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effective but inefficient and time consuming. Further, the waste man-
agementcompartmentoverhead lighting madeit difficult to obtain
sufficient facial illumination for grooming and hygiene chores. The
Skylab 4 crew felt that lighting throughout the cluster was adequate
and did not present a problem, with one possible exception: they
agreed with Skylab 2 and 3 crewmenthat directional desk-type lamps
would be desirable in sieep compartments, the wardroom, or any area
where one would read or write.
S.L.L. No.: 2-41
TITLE: DESIGN"EYE"AND"REACH"ENVELOPES
LESSON LEARNED: If zero-g operation of a console or control panel is
to be with foot restraint only, the design eyepoint should be an area
with its center higher than the accepted one-g counterpart. Likewise,
reach envelopes for zero-g workstations should be expanded from the
seated one-g standard to a foot restrained zero-g standard.
BACKGROUND: The Skylab Apollo telescope mount (ATM) console became
much more available to the crewman in zero gravity than it had been during
seated one-g training sessions. Most Skylab crewmembers used foot
restraints only when working at the ATM console.
S.L.L. No.: 2-42
TITLE: MANUAL DEXTERITY
LESSON LEARNED: The crewman's manual dexterity was not noticeably
impaired by prolonged exposure to zero gravity. Intravehicular
activities were performed with excellent dexterity throughout the mis-
sions; however, extravehicular activities continued to be hampered by
the dexterity limitations of the suit and gloves.
S.L.L. No.: 2-43
TITLE: VISUAL GRAVITY VECTOR
LESSON LEARNED: In weightless conditions, architectural adherence to
an up-and-down convention was found to be desirable as a convenience
but not as a constraint.
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BACKGROUND: The architecture of the Skylab orbital workshop was
gravity oriented. This orientation permitted ease of ground testing
and crew training. In flight, this convention provided the crew with
a familiar coordinate system permitting easy orientation, location
recognition, and equipment identification. The majority of crewmembers
favored this architectural arrangement.
S.L.L. No.: 2-44
TITLE: STANDARDIZATION FOR THE DESIGN OF OPERATING CONTROLS AND DISPLAYS
LESSON LEARNED: There should be standardizations imposed on the design
of all displays and controls used by the flightcrew (i.e., switches,
indicator lights, control knobs).
BACKGROUND: The lack of uniformity in the light indicators for the
different experiments comprising the Earth resources experiments
package caused confusion to the crewmember operating the equipment.
(For example, on one experiment the ready light went out while the
equipment was in the calibration mode, while in a second case the light
stayed on for the same mode of operation.)
REFERENCES: SC-D-007, General Specification for Displays and Controls
for Manned Spacecraft and Related Flight Crew Equipment - Functional
Design Requirements for, June 30, 1973; SC-M-003, General Specifica-
tions for Markings, Labeling, and Color, Manned Spacecraft and Related
Flight Crew Equipment - Requirements for, November 18, 1971; SC-L-002,
General Specifications for Lighting, Manned Spacecraft, and Related
Flight Crew Equipment - Requirements for, July 25, 1972.
S.L.L. No.: 2-45
TITLE: CONTROL CONSOLE PROTECTION
LESSON LEARNED: Control consoles should not normally be located along
major intravehicular activity crew traffic routes. When control panels
are located in high traffic areas, bump-proof switch guards should be
incorporated to preclude inadvertent switch actuations.
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BACKGROUND: The airlock module/multiple docking adapter area of Skylab
was a high-use passageway, yet the major spacecraft environmental
control system and electrical power system controls and displays were
located there. Instances of inadvertent switch or circuit breaker
actuation occurred frequently because switches were bumped inadvert-
ently or because the crew used existing panel guards as fingerhold
mobility or restraint aids.
S.L.L. No.: 2-46
TITLE: CREW HANDWASHER DESIGN
LESSON LEARNED: Future design should have an enclosedhandwasher that
would allow hand insertion for working directly with the water.
BACKGROUND: Skylab's handwasher was not enclosed and consequently was
used mostly to dampen a rag, which was then used "sponge fashion" to
wash. After soap contacted the rinse rag, it was useless for further
rinsing.
S.L.L. No.: 2-47
TITLE: SHOWER DESIGN
LESSON LEARNED: The shower bath concept of using a portable spray head
in Skylab was satisfactory, but the method of water removal after use
was not. The time and effort required to set up and take down the
shower was inconveniently long.
BACKGROUND: The Skylab 2 crew showered as scheduled but complained
about the mechanical inconvenience. They had favorable remarks to
offer on the stimulating and pleasant experience that a weekly shower
represented. The Skylab 3 crew retreated to Sponge baths with wash-
cloths in lieu of using the time required to erect, use, clean, and
disassemble the shower. Had it been more convenient, they would have
used it. However, the washcloth sponge bath was deemed "adequate" by
the Skylab crewmen.
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S.L.L. No.: 2-48
TITLE: SLEEPSTATIONDESIGN
LESSON LEARNED: Sleeping against the wall was acceptable in zero
gravity. Sleep stations should be insulated from outside light and noise
as much as possible. Sleep compartment ventilation should flow in a head-
to-foot pattern, not "up the nose." Flexibility in blanket arrangements
should also be provided to accommodate varying thermal conditions.
The sleep restraint concept was basically satisfactory; however, there
should be more restraint against the firm back than just the straps
provided for Skylab. The straps were strong enough but did not cover
a sufficient amount of body area.
BACKGROUND: Skylab crews slept satisfactorily in the erect against-
the-wall orientation, and the only relocation of sleep facilities was
attributable to environmental rather than psychological factors. Both
temperature and airflow triggered sleep restraint reorientations or
relocations. Skylab crews were extremely sensitive to auditory dis-
turbance while attempting to sleep. Illumination stimuli were more
controllable than noise.
S.L.L. No.: 2-49
TITLE: USE OF PROPRIETARY HARDWARE
LESSON LEARNED: Care should be exercised when using proprietary end
items. If no nonproprietary item can be substituted, the proprietary
item may be accepted through a waiver process. In such cases, the
item should be disassembled to identify components and materials, or
the manufacturer should be required to provide this information for
government use only. These constraints relative to the use of proprie-
tary items should also be levied against s_contractors by prime
contractors.
BACKGROUND: The use of proprietary items as parts of space hardware
has frequently resulted in the use of unreliable components and unac-
ceptable nonmetallic (i.e., flammable and toxic) materials. Failures
oT flight hardware have been caused by components that were not known
to be internal to proprietary assemblies. Examples include the Malaker
cooler used on the S191 infrared spectrometer and the sealed power
supply used on the S071/S072 vinegar gnats/pocket mice circadian rhythm
experiment.
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S.L.L. No.: 2-50
TITLE: EXPERIMENTS INPUTS NEEDED FOR SIMULATOR DESIGN
LESSON LEARNED: During the development of experiment simulations for
crew training, there must be good communications between the experi-
ment experts andthe simulation engineers.
BACKGROUND: Throughout the production of solar image, corona, and
radiation simulations for the Apollo telescope mount displays of the
Skylab simulator,:a team consisting of the Principal Investigators and
their colleagues advised the simulation engineers on the solar image
renditions. The goodlc0mmunications provided the feedback necessary
to assure the high fidelity rendition of image simulations required
for valid training.
S.L.L. No.: 2-51
TITLE: AVOIDING STRESS CORROSION
LESSON LEARNED: Designers should be conscious of stress corrosion and
should design specifically to avoid it. The use of ferrous or alumi-
num alloys susceptible to stress corrosion should be specifically
avoided.
BACKGROUND: A considerable amount of time and money was spent in
surveying Skylab hardware for materials susceptible to stress corrosion
and in surveying the applications of these materials. Hardware inspec-
tions and modifications to hardware were also required to eliminate
potential stress-corrosion problems.
REFERENCE: Stress-Corrosion Cracking in Metals, NASA SP-8082,
August 1971.
S.L.L. No.: 2-52
TITLE: REDUNDANT SYSTEMS SHOULD ALLOW CONCURRENT OPERATION IF DESIRED
LESSON LEARNED: Redundant systems and, in some cases, redundant com-
ponents should be designed to be capable of operating at the same time.
This approach would allow use of two systems or components if one were
marginally acceptable. The lack of this capability caused difficulty
in operating several Skylab systems after failures or anomalies occurred
in orbit.
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BACKGROUND: The orbital workshop refrigeration systems temperature
control valves (one valve in each of the two systems) had similar
failure indications (sticking). Whereas initially, cooling was
adequate with the operation of one nominal system, following system
failure (i.e., sticking valve), sufficient coolant could be passed
through th@ heat radiator only if both refrigerant systems were oper-
ated at the same time. Also, failure of one of four pumps in a system,
indicated by low delta pressure, could be analyzed by running two or more
pumps at the same time in lieu of turning on each pump separately in
a single system. The latter procedure would risk temporary system
shutdown if a malfunctioning pump were encountered.
S.L.L. No.: 2-53
TITLE: ONBOARD SPACECRAFT EXPERIMENT DATA READOUT
LESSON LEARNED: 0nboard experiment data readout and assessment capa-
bility should be designed into all future manned spacecraft. This
would allow the crewman to assess the experiment performance and thus
optimize experiment data taking as well as crew operational time.,
BACKGROUND: Some experiment data collected on Skylab 2 and 3 were
unusable because of equipment malfunction, errors in calibration, or
improper setup. Experiment test data on the ground could be compared
to sample onboard data for gross determination of acceptability.
S.L.L. No.: 2-54
TITLE: DESIGN OF CONTROLS AND DISPLAYS FOR EXPERIMENTS
LESSON LEARNED: The Apollo telescope mount (ATM) panel was divided by
experiment groupings. Operations would have been improved considerably
had the groupings been configured by function (i.e., thermal, power,
initialization, start, stop, etc.). (The S052 thermal was inadvertently
turned off by the crew because of its proximity to other frequently
operated switches.) Also, the logical operational sequences should be
considered and a programer provided that would initialize and then start
the experiments sequentially, as applicable, by the manipulation of a
minimum of controls. In the case of ATM-type experiments, the logic
could be programed by using the building blocks and/or joint observation
programs. The capability to alter the programer in real time with a
minimum of effort would be necessary. The use of a programer to control
the experiments would leave more of the crewman's time for scientific
evaluation and observation.
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BACKGROUND: During ATM operations in orbit, a very large fraction of
the crew time was devoted to throwing switches and very little time to
analyzing the experiment data for its usefulness and quality. Also, a
considerable amount of crew time was devoted to changing the crew
checklists of the joint observations project (JOP) summary sheets. If
the JOP's had been programed in a computer and a ground uplink provided
to change the program, a greater percentage of crew time could have been
used for analysis and evaluation of the data being observed.
NOTE: At the time the ATM control and display panel was designed,
representatives from both the NASA Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center and
the NASA George C. Marshall Space Flight Center collaborated on what
appeared to be the best design approach. The experience gained during
the Skylab missions pointed out potential improvements in design
philosophy.
TITLE: EXPERIMENT HARDWARE DESIGN
S.L.L. No.: 2-55
LESSON LEARNED: Criteria governing the design of experiment hardware
overrideshould include ease of operation, spacecraft interface, manual
override, and maintainability as well as those requirements dictated by
the scientific objectives.
BACKGROUND: The scientific gains from any experiment are dependent not
only on the hardware used to measure scientific phenomena but also on
the crewman's ability to operate the equipment. With several corollary
experiments, the first few operational periods were totally lost because
the crewman could not correctly operate the equipment. Whereas this may
reflect on training, the designer should be aware that the crewman may
receive very little training in his flight preparation. The hardware
design should include easy assembly and simple controls. Several Skylab
experiments were lost because there was very little, if anything, that
could be done to repair the hardware or to use it in a degraded mode.
In one particular case, the experiment was jettisoned from the workshop
because there was no way to manually override the malfunctioning
electronics.
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•TITLE: EXPERIMENT SYSTEM CONTROLS
S.L,L. No.: 2-56 _
LESSON LEARNED: Simplicity of operations should be a primary design
objective in integrated experiment facilities. Specific conditions to
avoid are:
i. Logic race conditions that impose time-delay constraints on switch
actuations by the crew.
2. Requirements for multiple switching operations to accomplish a single
system mode change.
3. Multiple system controls that include numerous invalid modes in the
various permutations of switch settings.
4. Requirements for specific switching sequences and timing to avoid
critical data losses due to tape recorder speed changes.
BACKGROUND: The operation of the Earth resources experiment package
from the control and display panel was so complex that it required an
inordinate amount Of time in preparing error-free switching time lines
and then required the complete attention of the operator to execute the
time line successfully The S193 experiment system was the primary
troublesome area with numerous switching constraints imposed to avoid
logic race problems or invalid modes.
S.L.L. No.: 2-57
TITLE: SPACE EXPERIMENT SYSTEMS MONITORING CAPABILITY
LESSONLEARNED: Space experiment systems intended for operation on a
repetitive basis should incorporate sufficient monitoring capability to
verify proper system operation. Although corrective measures may not
always be anticipated before flight, some method of recovering at least
partial capability can usually be devised if a problem is recognized.
BACKGROUND: The Earth resources experiment package (EREP) systems mon-
itoring capability was severely limited, as follows:
i. The information available in real time was provided by status lights
and a few analog meters. The status lights were not always inter-
preted properly and the crewman generally had inadequate time and
48
.
.
detailed systems knowledge to use the displayed analog data effec-
tively.
Near-real-time data were available when the EREP diagnostic downlink
unit (EDDU) was used, but because of the impact of data-support
schedules, its use was restricted to the diagnosis of problems after
identification.
In the absence of data for confirming satisfactory experiment opera-
tion on a routine basis, experiment accomplishments during the
mission were estimated, pending postmission assessment of the system
performance and data quality.
S.L.L. No.: 2-58
TITLE: USE OF COMMON SYSTEMS FOR MULTIPLE EXPERIMENTS
LESSON LEARNED: Operational constraints and/or capabilities should be
considered before using a common system for more than one experiment.
BACKGROUND: A common power system was used for the S052 and S054 Apollo
telescope mount experiments to drive the aperture doors. S054 had a very
wide field of view with no constraints on pointing off the solar disk,
while S052 was constrained to pointing at the center of the Sun. Re-
moving power from the door motors to maintain the S054 doors in the open
position following a mechanical anomaly jeopardized S052 operations.
S.L.L. No.: 2-59
TITLE: EXPERIMENT DESIGN - AUTOMATIC CONTROL LIMITS
LESSON LEARNED: Automatic control limits should be based on measurements
of the critical condition, not on an intermediate computation.
BACKGROUND: The S055 experiment had a pointing limit designed into the
Apollo telescope mount digital computer. This limit closed the door
when the pointing exceeded a predetermined value from Sun center. The
limit was derived from the fine Sun sensor wedges that commanded the
pointing system. The wedges only showed the desired pointing command
so that the resulting S055 limit was often invalid.
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S.L.L. No.: 2-60
TITLE: FILM AND MAGNETIC TAPE USAGE MEASUREMENTS
LESSON _ED: Accurate, reliable indications of the usage of film and
tape consumables are necessary for effective consumables management and
for proper data-recording verification.
BACKGROUND: The photosensitive strip tape-remaining instrumentation
provided for the Earth resources experiment package tape recorder was
too unreliable to be used because of nonlinearities and temperature
sensitivity. Theuse of a manual measuring technique on the tape reels
proved much more effective.
The film remaining indicator on the 140-foot data acquisition camera
(DAC) magazines was unreliable, with depletion normally occurring with
the indicator still showing more than 20 percent remaining. This
severely limited the effectiveness of managing the viewfinder tracking
system DAC film and of assessing the film coverage acquired.
S.L.L. No.: 2-61
TITLE: EXPERIMENT DATA IDENTIFICATION, RECORDING, AND TELEMETERING
LESSON LEARNED:
1. Spacecraft experiment data should be identified to aid in ground
data processing.
2. No single experiment should require more than one spacecraft recorder
at a time to record data.
3. When telemetering experiment data, not more than one downlink should
be required for a single experiment.
BACKGROUND: In Skylab, data from several experiments were mixed with
other experiment or operational systems data and no experiment identifi-
cation was included in the data. This increased the complexity of the
ground software task of data processing. Some biomedical experiment
data were recorded on two separate recorders, which required the pro-
cessing of two separate dump tapes. This compounded the ground data
retrieval problem, synchronization requirements, and doubled the effect
of data dropouts on experiment data.
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S.L.L. No.: 2-62
TITLE: EXPERIMENTINSTRUMENTALINEMENTSYSTEMSDESIGN
LESSON LEARNED:
l.
Each telescope should have its own independent alinement and
pointing system. If a group of telescopes is used, an additional
means of pointing them as a group should be provided.
. In-flight co-alinement of similar instruments should be provided.
The problems associated with ground co-alinement in a one-g
environment were significant and such a capability would lessen the
structdral requirements of a rigid platform (optical bench).
BACKGROUND :
1. Within the Apollo telescope mount (ATM) experiments, there were
three large field-of-view (FOV) instruments, two small FOV instru-
ments requiring precise pointing, and one instrument that could
only operate while pointed at the Sun's center. Therefore, the only
time all instruments could operate simultaneously was at Sun center,
an area of little activity compared to the remainder of the solar
disk. In addition, the alinement between the two small FOV instru-
ments was to satisfy both groups of Principal Investigators. These
factors often resulted in one or more instruments dropping out of a
joint observation progrsmbecause the pointing was not optimum.
This was particularly apparent near the end of Skylab 3 when film
was running short and investigators chose to omit their instruments
rather than accept marginal data for less than optimum pointing.
. Experiments S082B and S055 were alined before launch; however, during
the mission, the S082B slit was 105 arc seconds above the center of
the S055 raster pattern.
S.L.L. No.: 2-63
TITLE: DESIGN OF ZOOM TELESCOPES FOR INSTRUMENT POINTING
LESSON LEARNED: Variable magnification telescopes intended for use as
precise pointing aids for sensors should be designed with the optical
axis of the zoom lens precisely alined with the optical axis of the
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sensor. Any in-flight alinements necessary should be accomplished by
adjusting the zoomlens with integrated reticles rather than by merely
adjusting reticles apart from the lens. If specific zoomposition is
a factor in pointing control or data evaluation, the zoomsetting
should be instrumented.
BACKGROUND: The S191 experiment viewfinder tracking system telescope
was designed with adjustable reticles in the optical path between the
zoom lens and the viewing port. In-flight alinement capability was
provided by using a lighted cross and a sensor signal acquisition in-
dicator by adjusting the reticle position. Because of a disparity
between the optical axis of the instrument and the optical axis of the
zoom lens, the resultant alinement was valid only at one zoom setting.
This imposed an undesirable operational constraint in that data taking
had to be conducted at the zoom setting used for alinement. There was
no indication provided for zoom position except at the stops.
S.L.L. No.: 2-64
TITLE: REVIEW OF MULTIWORD COMPUTER UPLINKS
LESSON LEARNED: Future spacecraft systems capable of receiving multi-
word command loads for use by spacecraft software systems should have
prestorage buffer viewing capability. This permits ground or onboard
viewing of the information before its placement in the software working
memory.
BACKGROUND: This was a valuable capability in the command module com-
puter and the lunar module software, virtually eliminating the likeli-
hood of incorporating erroneous data. This capability was provided to
a limited extent in the Apollo telescope mount digital computer but not
in the launch vehicle digital computer. The lack of this capability
caused concern during the Apollo translunar insertion navigation update
and Skylab prelaunch rendezvous targeting experiences. In both situa-
tions, extensive planning and procedural efforts were required to mini-
mize the possibility of incorporating incorrect data.
S.L.L. No.: 2-65
TITLE: EXPERIMENT DATA SYSTEM DESIGN
LESSON LEARNED: Future manned space experiments should avoid instru-
ment design that submultiplexes all parameters into one digital word.
Parameters indicating the commanded state should be downlinked in
real time.
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BACKGROUND: One of the problems encountered on Skylab was associated
with the command and service module (CSM) spectrometer. This instru-
ment had five detectors that measured electrons in four channels and
protons in five channels. In addition, these were "housekeeping" meas-
urements indicating the operational status of the electronics and the
detectors. All these parameters were submultiplexed internally in the
instrument into a 13-bit digital word. This design presented the
following problems :
I.
Detector power was turned off on several occasions during which
ground control was not informed of the action for an average of
3 days while data were being processed off line at another location
at the NASA Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center. The problem occurred
because the spectrometer did not have real-time data. Decoding the
digital word required special processing.
.
,
Instrument operational status could only be monitored on a near-
real-time basis with a turnaround time of several days.
The CSM spectrometer was a crew health item (i.e., used for radia-
tion monitoring) and, therefore, the la_k of real-time data from the
instrument presented a problem in analyzing the true radiation haz-
ard to the crew.
S.L.L. No.: 2-66
TITLE: WAVEGUIDES INSTALLATIONS
LESSON LEARNED: If flex waveguide sections s_re used as an aid to aline-
ment in complex waveguide assemblies, particular attention should be
given to additional support in the immediate area of the flex sections.
One particularly good solution may be the addition of supports (or
splints) that provide redundant load paths to the flex sections.
BACKGROUND: Several cracks in flex sections of the S193 microwave/
radiometer/scatterometer experiment were caused by system level quali-
fication vibration testing. These cracks were prevented by the addition
of support brackets and by reduhdant load paths, as noted above.
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S.L.L. No.: 2-67
TITLE: CONDUCTIVEELEMENTPOTENTIOMETERAPPLICATION
LESSON LEARNED: When conductive-element-type potentiometers are used
and when the potentiometer is not provided with its own housing, par-
ticular attention should be given to providing protective shielding
(or sealing if at all possible) to provide protection from external de-
bris that could cause shorting of the conductive element to ground or
to some other circuit.
BACKGROUND: In the late stages of the Skylab 3 mission, the S193 micro-
wave/radiometer/scatterometer experiment lost control of the antenna
scan. This condition was subsequently partly corrected by clearing
stray conductive debris from the antenna position potentiometers during
an extravehicular activity (EVA).
S.L.L. No.: 2-68
TITLE: USE OF SWAGING TECHNIQUE IN LIEU OF "Z" WIRES ON PRINTED
CIRCUIT BOARDS
LESSON LEARNED: It is recommended that a swaging technique be used
instead of "Z" wires as interfacial connections through plated-through
holes in printed circuit (PC) boards. The technique uses a Utica Drop
Forge swaging tool, Model 470-5 or equivalent, to form a wedge on both
sides of a piece of copper wire inserted through the plated-through
hole. This technique offers the following advantages over "Z" wires:
i. Easier and faster installation
2. Less damage to printed wiring circuits because of tool slippage,
sharp wire edges, etc.
3. No rework because of "Z" wires turning away from the circuit pat-
tern during flow soldering
4. Simplified rework for removal of the through connector
5. No decrease in effectiveness of the interconnection
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BACKGROUND: Rework of any printed wiring connection necessitates the
application of heat and some force to effect component replacement on
PC boards. During rework of the S194 printed wiring boards, a combina-
tion of these factors caused lifted lands when the tolerance of the
land to adhere to the board was exceeded. The lands lifted when "Z"
wires were removed to allow the addition of hard wires for engineering
changes. The swaging technique, which subsequently proved very suc-
cessful, was implemented to facilitate PC board changes and to prevent
lifting of the land.
SECTION3
DESIGNPRACTICE
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S.L.L. No.: 3-1
TITLE: FLIGHTCREWDISPLAYSOFSYSTEMSTATUS
LESSON LEARNED: If more than one method (i.e., switch, crew keyboard
and/or ground command) is provided for accessing an onboard function, a
dedicated indicator, such as a talkback, must be provided to display the
current configuration.
BACKGROUND: In some cases, Skylab used latching switches to indicate
system configuration. If the configuration was subsequently changed
through the digital address system (DAS) or ground command, the crew
had no indication of systems configuration. This required extensive
ground/crew coordination, and in some cases, a special sequence of
"unnecessary" ground commands was required to be sent to ensure that
hardware functions matched onboard switches.
S.L.L. No.: 3-2
TITLE: TAPE RECORDER STATUS INDICATIONS AND COMMAND REQUIREMENTS
LESSON LEARNED: Indications should be provided to show onboard recorder
operation relative to selection, tape remaining, and recording status to
both the crew and the ground.
Minimize the number of commands required for such routine functions as
tape recorder management. Design recorders such that redundant data are
not dumped and implement transducers that provide maximum information.
BACKGROUND: If onboard data recorders are crew operated and ground
dumped, then the system should be designed to show tape position,
record initiation time, total record time, if rewound, etc. This has
always been a guessing game in the past.
The command module data storage equipment required far too many commands
for a routine dump. The Skylab Apollo telescope mount recorders neces-
sarily dumped redundant data. The crew was excessively inconvenienced,
and flight plan activity was impacted because the crew did not have
sufficient status information relative to the data/voice recorder. An
indicator of the time remaining on all the recorders, especially the
video tape recorder, would have helped a great deal.
PAG NOT
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S.L.L. No.: 3-3
TITLE : REALISTIC TOLERANCES
LESSON LEARNED: Care should be exercised to avoid the establishment of
impractical tolerances. If this is not done, the quality assurance
workload will increase because specifications will not be met and each
nonconforming item will have to be identified and material review board
actions will have to be initiated.
BACKGROUND: Excessively tight tolerances were established for some
experiment designs. Numerous waivers were processed against tolerance
requirements, which probably could have been relaxed for a more cost-
effective solution to the situation.
S.L.L. No.: 3-h
TITLE: ELECTRICAL AND FLUID CONNECTOR DESIGN
LESSON LEARNED: Fluid line and electrical connections should be
designed and labeled to preclude incorrect mating. .
BACKGROUND: Experience dictates that in mating fluid lines or electrical
connectors, it is possible to cross Connect (or reverse)the connec-
tions (e.g., fill as opposed to drain, reaction control system as
opposed to fuel, positive as opposed to negative, and pressurize as
opposed to bleed). Such items as plugs, disconnects, and couplings
should be designed to preclude connections that are not intended.
S.L.L. No.: 3-5
TITLE: SPACECRAFT GLASS WINDOW DESIGN
LESSON LEARNED: Fracture mechanics should be used as the principal
method of evaluating spacecraft glass structural designs and of
specifying the proof tests required to verify the safety of the design.
Proof tests should be conducted in an inert environment, particularly
one free from moisture, to ensure that the glass flaws do not grow
during the proof testing. Test evaluation criteria must also include
infrared (IR) and ultraviolet (UV) radiation considerations. The
pressure seal backup capability for single-pane windows should be
ve@ified as adequate for crew protection in the event of rapid decom-
pression dueto window failure.
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BACKGROUND: Glass strength degrades with time because of a combination
of stresses in certain environments, of which moisture is recognized
as the most detrimental. Some flaws are _lways created during the
manufacturing process but are generally not detectable by any known
method other than proof testing based on fracture mechanics analyses.
This method was used to evaluate both the command and lunar module
windows. Structural design requirements must consider the possible
degradation effects of exposure to space radiation on both the optical
and structural properties of the windows. In addition, the glass
should not transmit into the crew habitation area either UV or IR radia-
tion, which might affect the crew's health or actuate UV fire sensors.
REFERENCE: Apollo Experience Report - Spacecraft Structural Windows,
NASA TN D-7439.
S.L.L. No.: 3-6
TITLE: USE OF DISSIMILAR METALS IN ELECTROLYTE FLUID SYSTEMS
LESSON LEARNED: The use of dissimilar metals should be avoided in fluid
systems in which electrolytic solution exists in the plumbing. Both
the drawings and hardware should be visually inspected in systems in
which the potential for such problems exists. If electrons must be
conducted into the structure (i.e., when thervehicle structure is used
as an electrical conductor/ground return), an analysis should be per-
formed as a first step to determine their effects on corrosion of
joints of dissimilar metals.
BACKGROUND: The coolant loop used for the Skylab Earth resources
experiment package (EREP) tape recorders consisted of water with
inhibitors to control corrosion within the loop. Stainless steel and
aluminum were used at several Joints. The system was tested under
conditions similar to those expected in flight. The tests results
showed that the system should be satisfactory for flight; however, a
large amount of residue in the form of aluminum phosphate (AIPO 4) was
found in the filters during prelaunch inspections. A further complica-
tion was that the circuits within the EREP tape recorder used a struc-
tural ground (although a waiver was granted to permit this design
to save large costs of redesigning). The path of the current was,
in part, through the dissimilar metal Joints of the coolant system.
Variations in electrical resistance across the dissimilar metal in the
order of milliohms could drive aluminum ions into the coolant solution.
A chemical reaction with the inhibitors was thought to have caused
AIPO 4 to form at the joint because of the current through the joint.
A review of the detailed manufacturing drawings showed that dissimilar
metals existed in many more places than were previously documented in
the design._
REFERENCE: JSC Criteria and Standard DS-63 on usage of dissimilar
metals.

SECTION4
DEVELOPMENT
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S.L.L. No.: 4-1
TITLE: PRESSURECONTROL UNIT MALFUNCTION SIMULATOR
LESSON LEARNED: The pressure control unit (PCU) malfunction simulator
proved to be an invaluable tool for training the Skylab crews on basic
PCU operations, extravehicular mobility unit (EMU) malfunctions and
their corrective actions, and mission rules and philosophies. The
simulator also built up the crew's confidence in the operation of the
EMU hardware.
A simulator of this type should be mandatory for all future missions
where extravehicular activity (EVA) operations are involved.
BACKGROL_ND: A simulator of this type was requested several times during
the Apollo Program but was rejected on the basis of cost, time, etc.
Although Apollo crew training involved several Earth gravity
walkthroughs, vacuum chamber tests, etc., the crew's confidence in the
EMU hardware and associated malfunction procedures was not at the Skylab
level until very late in the program. A simulator of this type allows
the crewman to sit calmly at a desk, in a shirt-sleeve environment, and
devote all his attention to each system's operation and malfunction as
opposed to trying to gain the same knowledge by a walkthrough or
chamber test involving other support personnel and based on a strict
time line.
S.L.L. No.: 4-2
TITLE: OPERATIONS INPUTS TO SYST_MDEFINITION AND DEVELOPMENT
LESSON LEARNED: Operations personnel need to be involved in the defini-
tion and development phases of a manned space-flight program.
For future programs, at both the contractor facilities and within NASA,
the organizationalstructure should provide for an adequate flow of
experience and coordination from operational elements to the engineering
design and test groups during the definition and development phase.
Conversely, during the operational phases, direct participation of
designers should be assured.
BACKGROUND: In developing malfunction procedures for a system that has
already been designed, it frequently becomes evident that the system is
deficient in onboard controls and displays for rapid failure isolation
by the crew. As a result of these deficiencies, the isolation of the
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failure becomes a long cumbersome process and, in some cases, the
failures cannot be isolated. Participation by operationally experienced
personnel in the early design review activities tends to uncover these
design deficiencies while corrective action is possible with minimum
impact.
S.L.L. No.: 4-3
TITLE: EVALUATION OF DEVELOPMENT HARDWARE BEFORE BUILDING FLIGHT
HARDWARE
LESSON LEARNED: Flight hardware should not be built before adequately
evaluating breadboard and development verification test unit (DVTU)
models.
BACKGROUND: In the development of M171 metabolic analyzers, the flight
unit was built and stowed in the orbital workshop before the DVTUwas
delivered for physiological testing and verification. During labora-
tory testing, several design inadequacies were uncovered that impacted
the flight hardware and forced retrofits at additional expense to the
Government.
S.L.L. No.: 4-4
TITLE: EQUIPMENT PERFORMANCE SPECIFICATION AS OPPOSED TO SCIENCE
REQUIREMENTS
LESSON LEARNED: Before scientific hardware programs are implemented,
the scientific requirements should be made compatible with the technical
performance criteria and well defined relative to whether the perform-
ance criteria are within the bounds of the present-day technology.
BACKGROUND: The Skylab Earth resources experiment package science
hardware evolved from scientific requirements based on theoretical
values derived from the natural sources under investigation. These
criteria were used as stringent requirements for equipment performance.
In many instances, the equipment could not meet these goals. For
future programs, the relevance of the scientific requirements to what
is necessary and obtainable should be evaluated before equipment is
developed. Tradeoffs of scientific desirability as to what is
technically achievable should be made when the preponderance of desired
data can be achieved within the present state of the art. For instance,
an instrument resolution to l°K should not be specified as the absolute
limit when 1.5°K is adequate.
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Theoretical scientific requirements should be questioned, justified,
and incorporated into technical performance specifications only after
they have been fully evaluated. Consideration also should be given for
an incentive-type technical specification in those areas in which the
present state of the art will not meet the desired objectives.
S.L.L. No.: 4-5
TITLE: SPACE APPLICATION OF HIGH-DENSITY DIGITAL TAPE RECORDER
LESSON LEARNED: Multitrack stationary-head recording techniques can be
used to satisfy high-data-rate/high-data-storage capacities required
by spaceborne Earth resources experiments.
BACKGROUND: The Skylab Earth resources experiment package EREP) tape
recorder system recorded data rates of approximately i Mbps on 24 tracks
at 60 in/sec and 60 kbps on two tracks at 7.5 in/sec and 60 in/sec; it
recorded a frequency modulation composite consisting of inertial refer-
ence integrating gyro (IRIG) channels 13, B and D on two tracks at
7.5 in/sec and 60 in/sec. The total was 28 tracks on 1-incH-wide mag-
netic tape. The developed data-storage capacity was approximately
4.8 x i0 I0 bits/magnetic tape pack; the equipment was qualified at
approximately 3.8 × i0 I0 bits/tape pack, and it was used in Skylab at
approximately 3.5 × i0 I0 bits/tape pack. The bit error rate requirement
was 5 in 106 . This was the first known application in space of a data
packing density of 17 000 bpi/track on magnetic tape. This hardware is
adaptable to other space applications.
REFERENCES: MSC-03143, Development Test Report for EREP Tape Recorder;
MSC-05352, Test Report for EREP Magnetic Tape Evaluation Test Programs.

SECTION5
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S.L.L. No.: 5-1
TITLE: CONSIDERATIONS FOR USE OF OFF-THE-SHELF ITEMS
LESSON LEARNED: Designers should consider the use of commercially
available parts and materials as a routine practice when procuring new
hardware. There is always the option of using local vendors, as well
as that of securing competitive bids, when fabrication of noncritical
hardware is involved.
Some recommended guidelines for the use of off-the-shelf hardware are
as follows:
i. Materials testing of off-the-shelf items should focus on the spe-
cific application and generally should be nondestructive.
2. Nonflammable covers, when used, can preclude costly redesign of
internal items for flammability reasons.
. Off-the-shelf hardware should be disassembled and visually inspected
as part of the evaluation procedure before use. Reliance on the
contractor's inspection stamp and/or acceptance test results is not
always sufficient, as the documentation below illustrates.
BACKGROUND: The NASA Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center (JSC) used off-
the-shelf hardware for the contents of the science demonstration kit,
for the contents of the pressure garment assembly maintenance kit, for
hand exercisers, etc. When certifications appeared to be unwar-
ranted, appropriate waivers were executed. The orbital workshop
firehose was a Sears item covered with a Beta material.
The S071/S072 experiment on Skylab failed because of poor packaging of
an off-the-shelf inverter. Three off-the-shelf inverters that dis-
played the vendor's inspection stamp were tested to reasonable require-
ments. The inverters were subjected to variable thermal vacuum mission
profiles, and test results indicated that the hardware was ready for
flight. Subsequent to failure testing and analysis following the
mission, the two remaining inverters were opened for inspection. Con-
ductors in several places were very nearly exposed; in those instances
where wires were exposed (i.e., insulation was missing), a piece of
tape had been used to provide insulation from the metal case. In many
areas, there were also signs of charring of the potting material caused
by arcing from the conductors to the case, yet the inverters had passed
all previous tests. This failure could have been avoided if the
inverters had been disassembled and visually inspected before use.
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REFERENCES: JSC Policies and Procedures; JSCM 8080 Criteria and Stand-
ards; and WA-076 Memorandum, Beware of Off-the-Shelf Hardware,
October 17, 1973.
S.L.L. No.: 5-2
TITLE: PASSIVATION OF INTEGRATED CIRCUITS
LESSON LEARNED: Passivation of integrated circuits as a standard
requirement for high reliability integrated circuits should be investi-
gated early in a program. Cost tradeoffs should then be made before
implementation of blanket requirements.
BACKGROUND: Failures during qualification level vibrationtesting
occurred during the Skylab Program (e.g.,M093 vectorcardiogram: opera-
tional amplifiers) when metallic contamination inside the integrated
circuit shook loose and shorted adjacent traces. Passivation of the
die would have prevented most of these failures.
S.L.L. No.: 5-3
TITLE: PROCUREMENT OF ITEMS COMMON TO MORE THAN ONE CENTER
LESSON LEARNED: Separate Center and contractor procurements of the
same or similar items should be avoided, because this approach can
result in several specification number or part number callouts for the
same item. Common requirements for the same item by more than one
Center or contractor should be coordinated, and the commonality aspects
should be managed to the advantage of the program.
BACKGROUND: The NASA George C. Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC)
developed and provided basic zero-g connector specifications. Zero-g
connectors were required for power cables, Jumpers, utility cables,
camera cables, television cables, etc. Initially, several specification
numbers and part numbers were created to specify the same zero-g con-
nector. Total program inventories on connectors were difficult to
obtain, and multiple procurements were conflicting.
The NASA Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center (JSC) zero-g connector
procurement was consolidated by the Program Office, and the purchase
request had a feature added that stated that any MSFC engineering order
changes to the basic specification were applicable to JSC procurements.
This accelerated JSC procurement and allowed application of coordinated
allocation and priorities for items in short supply.
SECTION6
MANUFACTURING
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S.L.L. No.: 6-1
TITLE: CONFORMALCOATINGOFDUALIN-LINE PACKAGEINTEGRATEDCIRCUITS
LESSON LEARNED: An overly thick layer of conformal coating under the
body of the dual in-line package caused cracking of the package under
thermal cycling.
BACKGROUND: Some Skylab experiments (i.e., M092 and the Earth
resources experiment package) experienced cracking of the dual in-line
packages, which was traced to thermally-induced stresses between the
conformal coating and the package. After the thickness of the coating
was reduced, no further cracking problems were encountered.
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S.L.L. No.: 7-1
TITLE: PRELAUNCHCHECKOUT
LESSON LEARNED: Space vehicle systems should be checked out to the
end-item. Instead of verifying that a piece of equipment draws
"x" amperes when power is applied through a switch, the proper piece of
equipment controlled by that switch should be verified as operative.
BACKGROUND: The Skylab 3 command and service module hydrogen tank
heaters and fans were miswired. When the crewman actuated the hydrogen
tank i heaters and fans, the hydrogen tank 2 heaters and fans came on,
and vice versa. This miswiring was not detected in prelaunch checkout.
S.L.L. No.: 7r2
TITLE: ACCEPTANCE TESTING OF BIOMEDICAL HARDWARE
LESSON LEARNED: All biomedical hardware should be in accordance with
its designated experiment requirements.
BACKGROUND: Early qualification and acceptance testing of the MI71
metabolic analyzer was inadequate because no manned tests were included.
The metabolic analyzer functioned adequately with a mechanical pump,
but it did not perform adequately with a human subject at rest or per-
forming exercise. Specifically, the electronic trigger for the spiro-
meters functioned well with a sine-wave mechanical pump but false
triggered when subjected to human respiratory patterns.
S.L.L. No.: 7-3
TITLE: COMMONALITY OF GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT
LESSON LEARNED: Identical sets of ground support equipment (GSE) should
be used at each location where preinstallation acceptance (PIA)testing
is to be done, and these should be identical to those used for initial
in-plant predelivery acceptance. Seemingly innocuous changes in instruc-
tion, pressure gage ranges, plumbing, and procedures can cause confusing
and sometimes erroneous indications of hardware performance.
BACKGROUND: The Gemini Program pointed out very graphically that
changes in the GSE affect interpretation of hardware performance. The
extravehicular life support system GSE used at the NASA John F.
Kennedy Space Center (KSC) for preflight PIA differed markedly from
that used at the contractor's establishment and at other sites. Rota-
meters were used instead of laminar flow elements; procedures varied;
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and locations in the system where critical performance parameters were
sensed also differed for arbitrary reasons. It was not until Just
before Gemini XII that the full extent of and reasons for differences
in test philosophy, results, etc., were finally understood. In the
Skylab Program, definite attempts were made to use the same GSE at the
contractor's establishment, at the NASA Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center,
and at the KSC. The attempts were successful, and the only differences
in equipment involved peculiarities of the gas supply systems and the
vacuum systems. Thus, test results could be discussed more universally
between sites.
S.L.L. No.: 7-4
TITLE: DOCUMENTATION REQUIREMENTS FOR QUALIFICATION AND ACCEPTANCE
TEST PLANS
LESSON LEARNED: Do not levy the requirements of Sections 4.0,
Exhibits II (Prime Equipment) and IV (Identification Items), Parts I
and II of NASA Procurement Circular (NPC) 500-1 or NASA Handbook (NHB)
8040.2 on suppliers or manufacturers of end-items. The Qualification
Test Plan and Acceptance Test Plan, respectively, will satisfy these
requirements.
The contract end-item specifications can be simplified by eliminating
Section 4.0, Parts I and II of Exhibit I and IV of NPC 500-1 or
NHB 8040.2. These requirements can be combined with those of the
Qualification Test Plan (Part l) and Predelivery Acceptance Test Plan
(Part II). Both 4.0 section_ are redundant with the plans and only
increase contract cost.
BACKGROUND: The contract end-item specifications, Parts I and II,
contain primiarily five sections. Section 3.0 of both parts is require-
ments, and Section 4.0 of both parts is test/verification of the
requirements listed in Section 3.0. Sections 3.0 and 4.0 of Part I
form the basis for the Certification (Qualification) Test Plan. Like-
wise, Sections 3.0 and 4.0 of Part II form the basis for the Acceptance
Test Plan. Both of these plans are type I and are under formal change-
board control.
The data contained in both Section 4.0's - specifically, paragraphs 4.1
and subsequent paragraphs - are repeated in the pertinent test plans
and are thus redundant. Both of the Section h.0's are thoroughly
reviewed against the applicable Section 3.0.
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Deleting paragraphs 4.1 and subsequent paragraphs of both Section 4.0's
results in the following advantages:
1. A change to either Section 3.0 requires only one additional change
(to the plan), not two (the plan and Section 4.0).
. The thorough review previously applied to Sections 3.0 and 4.0 and
to the plan versus Section _.0 would be applied only to the plan
versus Section 3.0.
3. Redundancy is eliminated.
S.L.L. No.: 7-5
TITLE: MANNED ALTITUDE TESTING OF EXPERIMENT AND SPACECRAFT SYSTEMS
LESSON LEARNED: Manned altitude Chamber tests that simulate critical
mission sequences should be conducted on equipment sensitive to
operation at reduced pressure. Short-duration crew reviews, such as
crew station, transfer, stowage, crew compartment fit and function,
etc., do not enable the crew and the crew representatives to
identify all discrepancies in experiment and crew-equipment design,
stowage, and usage. Mission simulation testing at altitude, using
flight equipment, provided an excellent opportunity to identify and
resolve discrepancies in hardware designed for flight. Many of the
discrepancies identified in the Skylab medical experiments altitude
test (SMEAT) might not have been discovered otherwise until during a
mission. Validation of flight procedures, checklists, and nomenclature
was also accomplished in the SMEAT.
BACKGROUND: The SMEAT exercised flight configuration equipment under
conditions similar to those planned for flight. Several hundred
anomalies were recorded and resolved long before Skylab was launched.
Manycorrections in nomenclature, markings, equipment handling, food
and beverage quantities, waste management system urine and fecal collec-
tion equipment, and vacuum cleaner equipment resulted from the SMEAT.
S.L.L. No.: 7-6
TITLE : TEST PROCEDURES
LESSON LEARNED: Flight operational procedures should be incorporated
in tests at the earliest practical/possible date.
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BACKGROUND: Ground testing was the only method for verifying flight
procedures for the Earth resources experiment package. When these pro-
cedures were finally tested, it was found that many of the constraints
that were required to be written in were really ground test constraints
not applicable to flight and were, in fact, not valid constraints at all.
S.L.L. No.: 7-7
TITLE: INTEGRATED SYSTEM QUALIFICATION TESTING
LESSON LEARNED: Integrated system qualification testing should be used
instead of redundant component/subassembly testing. To determine
whether the philosophy is economically desirable, a trade-off study has
to be made of the increased complexity in test setup and failure isola-
tion as opposed to the cost savings realized by the reduced number of
tests.
BACKGROUND: Some Skylab medical experiment hardware had to undergo
delta-qualification vibration testing when it was found that it had been
tested at the subassembly level to a lower vibration level than it
would encounter in its integrated system configuration.
S.L.L. No.: 7-8
TITLE: UNIFORMITY OF TEST AND CHECKOUT PROCEDURES FOR VARIOUS SITES
LESSON LEARNED: Procedures for performing identical tests at different
locations should be made uniform to avoid different sequences.
BACKGROUND: Problems were encountered during testing at the NASA John
F. Kennedy Space Center (KSC) because of the disparity between in-plant
procedures and the KSC procedures for performance of identical tests.
Frequently, the disparity was due to ground support equipment (GSE)
differences; however, procedures not affected by GSE configuration
should be identical for each site. Standard sequences for test prepara-
tion sheet inclusion should be provided to preclude out-of-sequence
functions. Central control and dissemination of test documents is
recommended.
81
S.L.L. No.: 7-9
TITLE: ACCEPTANCET STANDCHECKOUTREQUIREMENTS
LESSON LEARNED: Acceptance tests and checkout procedures should verify
wiring and controls separately for each path or function. Wiring
should be coded to clearly identify not only each wire in the bundle
but also the terminal at adjacent terminal boards.
Experiment hardware and subsystems should be tested in a configuration
as close as possible to the flight configuration, following functional
checkout at the vendor or integration area. Integrated systems testing
for interfacing systems, subsystems, or components should be planned
at the earliest practical phase of program planning and test require-
ments definition, and the plan should be included in the test checkout
and requirements specificatio n document before final approval of the
document.
BACKGROUND: The service module cryogenic hydrogen tank power controls
for the fans and heaters were interchanged between tanks 1 and 2 by
miswiring at the terminal boards. The wiring for both was color coded
identically. The airlock-module/multiple-docking-adapter altitude
chamber testing at the McDonnell Douglas AstronauticsCompany - East
did not include a fully integrated spacecraft response to varying
extravehicular mobility unit system operations. Such integrated testing
was not accomplished until approximately 60 days before launch. If
problems had been discovered at that time, the launch schedule might
have been impacted.

SECTION8
FLIGHTOPERATIONS
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S.L.L. No.: 8-1
TITLE: IN-ORBIT CREW STAY TIME
LESSON LEARNED: Psychological and physiological conditions of the
flightcrew resulting from the 84-day visit indicated no constraints for
long-duration flights. For exsmple, the food and sleep requirements
were about the same as on the ground; but to maintain reasonable phys-
ical condition of the muscles, i to 1.5 hours of deliberate daily
exercise were required by each crewman.
S.L.L. No.: 8-2
TITLE: INDIVIDUAL INTRAVEHICULAR ACTIVITY CREW TASK TIMES IN
ZERO GRAVITY
LESSON LEARNED: As a result of one-g training experience, very few crew
tasks were found to take longer in zero gravity than had been planned.
Excessive conservatism in time lining individual tasks should be avoided
to allow more productive time in orbit; however, flexibility in time
lining should be retained to allow for general housekeeping tasks plus
routine and unscheduled maintenance.
BACKGROUND: Most Skylab individual task times were equal to or less
than one-g baselines because of the expanded "envelope of attack"
available to the crewman with respect to "getting at" the job. The
Skylab crews often asked for additional tasks to fill voids created by
conservative time lining. Exceptions to this situation were usually
associated with tasks requiring logistic management of multiple piece
parts. In the early days of each mission, housekeeping and mainte-
nance tasks often intruded into operational or experimental time blocks.
S.L.L. No.:
TITLE: EXTRAVEHICULAR ACTIVITY WORK TASKS IN ZERO GRAVITY AND
ONE GRAVITY
LESSON LEARNED:
i.
.
8-3
Extravehicular activity (EVA) workloads were, on the average,
approximately 20 percent less than predicted.
The time required for EVA performed in one gravity (even in the
water immersion facility) should be multiplied by 1.5 to 2.0 to de-
termine the amount of time required to perform in zero gravity.
PRECEDING PAGE BLANK NOT
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BACKGROUND: After 4 years of lunar-surface EVA operations with only
minimal zero-g operations on the Apollo 15 to 17 missions, sev-
eral unknowns still remained as to how the Skylab crewmen would perform
during extended periods of zero gravity. In most instances, the crews
purposely paced themselves to avoid both fatigue and errors. This was
evidenced by the number of hours of EVA and the complexity and bulk of
tasks performed. In most instances, ground training/simulation involved
near ideal conditions with respect to lighting, assistance, hardware
fidelity, etc. This system minimized crew/support personnel/facility
time and optimized procedures and hardware development.
S.L.L. No.: 8-4
TITLE: PRESLEEP ACTIVITY PERIOD
LESSON LEARNED: A presleep period of 1 hour of mentally nondemanding
activity should be planned in the crew's time line.
BACKGROUND: In the early phases of the missions, Skylab crewmen com-
plained that too often they were scheduled to perform operational or
experimental activities right up until the beginning of their sleep
period and that it was quite difficult to relax abruptly and go to
sleep. The 1 hour of uninterrupted presleep activity was observed as a
constraint during Skylab h.
S.L.L. No.: 8-5
TITLE: IMPROVE USE OF IN-ORBIT CREW TIME THROUGH GROUND CONTROL
LESSON LEARNED: Ground controlled or automatically sequenced equipment
and experiments allow activities to occur during crew rest and sleep
periods. Ground control should be used for repetitive or time-consuming
functions that do not require onboard crew Judgment. Future programs
should review all functions desired during crew sleep, eat, and
unmanned periods for possible accomplishment by ground controlled
functions.
BACKGROUND: In Skylab, experiments such as the Apollo telescope mount
(ATM) S055 and the ATM pointing control were accomplished through
ground commands during unmanned periods, while the flightcrew was not
in attendance. Ground control also was used successfully for the solar
array electrical power generating system, the data and video recorder
tape _<_anagement, and the control moment gyro momentum management.
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S.L.L. No.: 8-6
TITLE: PRIVATECOMMUNICATIONS
LESSON LEARNED: There was an occasional need for private communications
with the crew for mission management purposes. The restrictions
against such private communications in Skylab prevented a free exchange
of information with the crew on the subjects of scheduling activities
and workload.
BACKGROUND: Both the flightcrews and the flight control teams were
reluctant to discuss flight planning and workload scheduling problems
on the open air-to-ground circuit because of concern for potential
misquoting or misunderstanding by the pres s . The capability to have
some private management discussions with the flightcrew without causing
concern in the press would have made resolution of some of the flight
planning problems much easier. A free exchange of thinking was
frequently needed to prevent potential problems of overscheduling the
crew, but the Skylab rules for private communication precluded this
mode of operation.
S.L.L. No.: 8-7
TITLE: STOWAGE PROCEDURES AND 0NBOARD INVENTORY MANAGEMENT
LESSON LEARNED: A practical and streamlined equipment stowage inventory
management and accounting system is needed during the mission operations
phase of the program. The system should output crew data in the exact
format to be used by the crew and should be compatible with the real-
time uplink to the orbiting spacecraft for presentation on board. The
system should also track other onboard data references affected by a
given stowage change.
BACKGROUND: The single most difficult area of the final Skylab flight
data file development for each mission was the change traffic in the
stowage list document. Of necessity, the stowage list and the launch,
in-flight, and return stowage locations were constantly changing. This
required late and significant revisions to the stowage document, which
was the crew's overall reference on loose item location, quantity, and
transfers. Checklists with stowage data were also impacted.
Several instances arose in Skylab in which an item became "lost" and
the ground had to institute a search through transcript review and crew
questioning about last usage or sighting.
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S.L.L. No.: 8-8
TITLE : FLEXIBLE CREW PROCEDURES
LESSON LEARNED: A flexible flight data file (FDF) that accommodates
preflight and real-time changes is necessary to maximize the return
from a manned space-flight mission in which the conditions change.
Future FDF's should be designed to accommodate late changes in mission
requirements and changes resulting from varying conditions during the
mission. Some areas to consider are:
i. Design procedures to avoid changes caused by alternate launch days.
. Avoid highly structured detailed procedures that are unique to a
single trajectory and overly sensitive to conditions that can be
expected to vary.
In summary, the crew procedures system should provide the capability to
change procedures, train the crewmen, and eventually uplink changes to
the crew in an efficient and accurate manner without undue burden on the
people who operate the system.
BACKGROUND: Many past program elements have assumed that crew proce-
dures become static after the flight hardware is built. This assumption
leads to the conclusion that crew procedures should be controlled in the
same manner as the hardware configuration is controlled. Skylab, as
well as previous programs, has shown that this approach is ineffective
for the following reasons:
i. Training exercises continually uncover better ways of performing an
operation by:
a. Improving the procedure.
b. Increasing the efficiency of the crew to execute the procedure.
2. Requirements are continually changing as a result of:
a° Improvement in an investigator's understanding of his basic
data requirements and the capability of his instruments to col-
lect the data.
b. Improvement in the capability of the operations organization to
collect the required data.
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c. Improvement of the understanding of the data requester's re-
quirements by the operations organization; also, improvement of
the investigator's understanding of the operational systems.
Conditions change (i.e., storms, earthquakes, hardware failures,
etc.). The following data are indicative of the number of changes
made to Skylab crew procedures:
Period of Skylab 2 Skylab 3 Skylab 4
change
Preflight
Real time
Total
2083
86
2169
677
275
952
763
413
1176
S.L.L. No.: 8-9
TITLE: REAL-TIME UPDATING REQUIREMENTS
LESSON LEARNED: The teleprinter provided greater flexibility in Skylab
flight planning than had ever been possible in previous programs. A
larger, more versatile teleprinter with graphics features would be
highly desirable for future manned programs. Flight data file (FDF)
changes should require a minimum of crew involvement; uplink entire new
pages, be sure the changes fit on the checklist page format, and avoid
pen-and-ink changes. If possible, upiink each crewman's messages on
one continuous piece of paper. This minimizes sorting. Flight control-
lers should have Some independent authority in communicating via tele-
printer (or teleprinterlike devices). Minimize the number of interfaces
required for a flight controller to transmit information to the crewmem-
bers in orbit.
BACKGROUND: In the course of the Skylab Program, nearly 4000 tele-
printer messages were uplinked, each of which varied from less than 15
to over i000 lines in length. Information concerning every phase of
mission operations items was transmitted. A significant amount of
crew time was required to keep the FDF up to date.
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S.L.L. No.: 8-10
TITLE: TELEPRINTERUPLINKMESSAGEGENERATION
LESSON LEARNED: Text message generation for transmission to the space-
craft should be designed such that a minimum of computer and hardware
interfaces is required.
BACKGROUND: In Skylab, four computers were required to generate a rou-
tine teleprinter uplink message. Computer checkpoints and unscheduled
downtime frequently interrupted message generation, resulting in sig-
nificant delays.
S.L.L. No.: 8-11
TITLE: SCIENTIFIC COMMUNICATIONS WITH CREW IN ORBIT
LESSON LEARNED: Frequent informal communications between the scientist
astronaut in orbit and the scientific ground-support personnel signif-
icantly enhanced the amount and quality of experiment data obtained.
BACKGROUND: Data collection for the Apollo telescope mount experiments
was significantly increased in quantity and quality by the frequent and
ragid uplink of solar activity data generated by the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration by weekly (and later daily) discussions
between the scientist pilot (SPT) in orbit, the Principal Investigator
(PI) or his representative, and the ground-based scientist astronaut.
The SPT used special uplinked data on flares and coronal and disk tran-
sients to obtain data he would have otherwise missed. His discussions
with the PI's and the ground-based scientist astronaut clarified changes
in procedures and program priorities and informed him of the results of
current data analyses. The PI's were informed of favorable opportun-
ities for taking data on solar phenomena of interest.
S.L.L. No.: 8-12
TITLE : ONBOARD DATA ENHANCEMENT
LESSON LEARNED: More data of better quality were obtained by allowing
the onboard scientist astronaut to function as a scientist in the plan-
ning, modification, and implementation of the details of experiment
operations.
BACKGROUND: In Skylab B and Skylab 4, substantial amounts of observa-
tion time were scheduled for the scientist pilots to permit them to
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use their knowledge of solar physics and the ATM"shopping lists" to
obtain unique and opportune data. During these periods, the scientist
pilots functioned as scientists. The Naval Research Laboratory stated
that they got their best data during observation time and that all
other experiments significantly benefited from the work of the SPT's.
To obtain optimum flare, coronal, and disk transient data, it was nec-
essary to rely on the crewman's judgment and training. The recording
of early flare-rise data by the Skylab 4 science pilot required scien-
tific judgment and perseverance, as well as a perfected operational
technique and a certain amountof intuition.
During Skylab 4, it was found that manyperplexing problems causedby
erratic solar phenomena(disappearance of prominences, etc.) could be
avoided by giving the crewmenthe authority to modify the uplinked
schedule and to use their judgment in selecting the best targets or al-
ternate times to perform a given observation program.
It should be noted that the scientist pilots' enthusiasm and general
morale were substantially increased by the opportunities that afforded
them to function as scientists.
S.L.L. No.: 8-13
TITLE: USEOFWASTEMATERIALSEJECTEDFROMA SPACESTATIONOR
SPACECRAFT
LESSON LEARNED: Waste gases and liquids vented from the space vehicle
could be used for attitude control by venting them through directional
nozzles. Even though the thrust obtained may be small, the energy
could be used as the ventings occur to improve the momentum positions
of the control moment gyros (CMG's) (i.e., store the energy, attained
through waste dumps, for CMG's through momentum management).
BACKGROUND: Vents and dumps of gases _d llquids caused unwanted
momentum disturbances in Skylab. The _bi!ity to control systematically
or to eliminate these momentum disturb_ces could have reduced the use
of attitude control propellant and thus could have increased the
control margin of the CMG's.
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S.L.L. No.: 8-14
TITLE: DISADVANTAGESOFFRAGMENTEDSKYLABEXPERIMENTSIMULATION
LESSON LEARNED: When training in experiments operation is required
during simulations, the simulation system should be designed so that
the experiment simulation is integrated with the total simulation sys_
tem that is comparable to the real yehicle.
BACKGROUND: The simulation system for Skylab experiments training was
rather fragmented. The Skylab simulator involved only the Apollo tele-
scope mount experiments. Most of the Saturn workshop experiments
were performed in the one-g trainer that was located approximately
400 feet from the Skylab simulator. The one-g trainer output telemetry
for only the biomedical experiments while other required experiment
telemetry was output by the ground-s_stems simulation computer. The
Earth resources experiment package simulator was attached to the Skylab
simulator but did not interface with the Skylab simulator computer.
With this type of fragmented simulation training, the crews were incon-
venienced and it was difficult for simulation support personnel to keep
pace with the crew's activity to ensure that all simulation systems
were properly configured.
S.L.L. No.: 8-15
TITLE: JOINT OBSERVATION PROGRAM CONCEPT
LESSON LEARNED: The joint observation program (JOP) concept was excel-
lent and resulted in the production of maximum data for minimum Prin-
cipal Investigator/crew interface during the mission. The JOP's were
developed before the mission for the assessment of solar features of
interest. Each JOP resulted in the compilation of information regard,
ing the solar feature, desired instrument operating modes, and pointing
instructions. However, because the JOP's were developed before the
mission, they could not provide for instrument malfunctions nor could
they be used to exploit the knowledge gained during the mission. Con-
sequently, future mission operations should allow for changes in the
JOP's and their constituent building blocks to permit exploitation of
data gathered during the mission and to compensate for instrument
degradation.
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S.L.L. No.. 8-16
TITLE: EXPERIMENTHARDWAREFAMILIARIZATIONFORMISSIONCONTROL
CENTERPERSONNEL
LESSON LEARNED: It is recommended that Mission Control Center (MCC)
console manning personnel acquire firsthand familiarization with the
operation of the experiment hardware in their respective areas of
responsibility.
BACKGROUND: The results of Skylab showed that each crewman performed
his experiment protocol differently. These limits of variation could
be better understood and appreciated by those MCC Personnel having
firsthand knowledge of equipment operation.
S.L.L. No.: 8-17
TITLE: USE OF SIMULATION CONTROLLERS AS FLIGHT CONTROLLERS
LESSON LEARNED: In future programs, consideration should be given to
using simulation controllers as flight controllers.
BACKGROUND: Most simulation controllers served as flight controllers
for Skylab. They were given positions for which the basic required
knowledge was essentially the same as for their simulation position.
In addition, they received on-the-job training with an experienced
operator (during Skylab 2) before manning the consoles alone. This use
of simulation controllers worked well.
S.L.L. No.: 8-18
TITLE: FUNCTIONAL SIMULATION OF COMPUTERS
LESSON LEARNED: Functional simulation of flight computers is not rec-
ommended for use in training systems.
BACKGROUND: A functional simulation of the Apollo telescope mount (ATM)
digital computer was provided in the Flight Operations Directorate sim_
ulation of the Saturn workshop. It was not possible to maintain the
simulation in a current status with the real digital computer because
of the delay resulting from having to reprogram the system each time a
change occurred. The functional simulation did not provide memory dump
and troubleshooting capability. Also, when training with a functional
simulation and an unexpected response occurred, the trainee was usually
uncertain as to whether he made a mistake or the simulation was working
incorrectly.
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The Skylab simulator had a real ATM digital computer, which could be
updated by playing in a tape of the latest flight program. It was an _
excellent training tool and provided easy, rapid, and inexpensive up-
date capability.
S.L.L. No.: 8-19
TITLE: REAL-TIME MISSION PLANNING REQUIREMENTS
LESSON LEARNED: A formal communication system between science planning
personnel and console operators is required to ensure continuity in
planning, execution, and analysis of science programs. Some suggestions
for accomplishing such a system are as follows:
l. Hold the planning conference in a room adjacent to the science room
so that the execute "czar" (ATM principal spokesman) can attend.
This would also allow the "execute plans" personnel to answer ques-
tions and would eliminate the need for flight control personnel to
support the conference full time.
. Use two execute czars with one in the science room and one serving
as planning chairman. They would exchange duties each day; this
would allow the czar to execute the plan he developed the previous
day at the planning conference.
3. Require each instrument group to provide detailed written rationales
for their planned experiment modes each day.
BACKGROUND: During Skylab, the execute czar did not always understand
the plans developed by the planning conference. In one instance, he
thought some plans were in error and therefore changed some instrument
operating modes and pointing to the consternation of the Principal
Investigator, who had deliberately planned the modes. In other instances,
the execute czar could not answer crew questions regarding the plan and
did not have a strong basis for making real-time inputs. Conversely,
information gathered by the console czar was often not passed along
to the planning conference, and the summary czar had very little input
from the conference regarding the summary plan inputs he should make.
S.L.L. No.: 8-20
TITLE: LOW-PRIORITY EXPERIMENTS FOR FLEXIBLE FLIGHT PLANNING
LESSON LEARNED: It was extremely useful to the flight planners to have
several low priority experiments available that did not have firm
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scheduling requirements. These experiments were used as "fillers" when
time was available between the "regular" experiments.
BACKGROUND: In designing the daily flight plan during Skylab, it was
not always possible, for a variety of reasons, to fill the time avail-
able with the preplanned experiments. In such cases, it was useful to
have a reservoir of activities, which could be used to fill this open
time. Ideally, such activities should be reasonably short, one-man tasks
that are not critical. On Skylab, such tasks included a series of science
demonstrations, low-priority experiments and detailed test objectives that
had been approved before the mission on an if-time-is-available basis,
and non-time-critical experiment or systems test activities generated
during the mission. Scheduling of these activities contributed to
increased efficiency in the use of crew time by providing worthwhile
activities in an otherwise idle time period.
S.L.L. No.: 8-21
TITLE: AVAILABILITY OF PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATORS DURING MISSION OPERATIONS
LESSON LEARNED: Except for the most routine and passive experiments, it
is extremely useful for the Principal Investigator (PI), or someone Who
can speak authoritatively for a given experiment, to be physically
available during the mission.
BACKGROUND: During Skylab, there were many occasions during both experi-
ment operations and planning meetings when questions arose that could
only be satisfactorily answered by an authoritative spokesman for the
investigator. To provide realistic inputs to the scheduling of experiment
activities during the mission, the experimenter must maintain an up-to-
date knowledge of the mission situation including the overall constraints
and limitations that influence his experiment accomplishments. The best
way to maintain such knowledge and to ensure the inclusions of such inputs
was for the PI to be on the scene continually during the mission. When
the spokesmen were available in the experiment support rooms or at the
planning meetings, their inputs were timely and effective. On occasions
when the PI's were not available, use of the long distance telephone was
often ineffective and resulted in some reduced efficiency in performing
the experiment. The difficulties with the use of the telephone were
attributed to the following problems:
IQ Difficulty in locating the individual needed on short notice,
particularly because some of the questions came up at unpredictable
times.
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e Inefficiency of the telephone as a means of communicating complex
situations to the absent PI, as well as the need to bring him up to
date in most cases.
S.L.L. No.: 8-22
TITLE: IMPROVE PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR DATA VIEWING FACILITIES
LESSON LEARNED: For future missions, suitable locations should be pro-
vided for principal investigators to review flight data. These facil-
ities should be equipped to display science data for quick turnaround.
BACKGROUND: Principal investigator quick turnaround data reviews were
often delayed several hours because the reviewer had to locate a spare
corner, a room, or an office in which to review the data. Display fac-
ility suggestions are as follows:
i. There should be sufficient space between data-viewing devices for
several reviewers to assess the data simultaneously.
2. Tables should be provided adjacent to each display device for note
taking and hardcopy review.
Q The data reviewing room should be large enough to support multiple
disciplines simultaneously. This suggests that a minimum number of
each type of display device'should be made available.
_o The facility should not necessarily be located in the Mission Control
Center; however, it should be closely located and should contain
appropriate communications equipment to allow rapid feedback to
mission operations.
S.L.L. No.: 8-23
TITLE: MISSION OPERATIONS CONTROL ROOM POSITIONS FOR MAJOR EXPERI-
MENT AREAS
LESSON LEARNED: The creation of mission operations control room (MOCR)
positions representing the major experiment areas was an effective
technique for handling the operational aspects of the Skylab experiments
and also for providing daily inputs to the experiments flight planning.
BACKGROUND: During Skylab, there were Apollo telescope mount, Earth
resources experiment package, medical, and corollary experiment flight
controllers who had a thorough understanding of the requirements, hard-
ware constraints, and operational limitations of their experiment areas
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and who contributed significantly to the successful operation of their
experiments. These experiment flight controllers manned positions in
the MOCR, on a three-shift basis, as regular members of the flight con-
trol teams with ready access to the flight director.
S.L.L. No.: 8-24
TITLE: PROGRAM SCIENTIST
LESSON LEARNED: The Skylab Program Scientist provided an effective
interface between the experiment investigators and the flight control
team for establishing daily experiment schedules and for resolving
conflicts among scientific disciplines. The Program Scientist, serving
as a single point of contact, represented the Program Manager in dealing
with the scientific investigators, and he represented the scientific
investigators in dealing with the Flight Director.
The Program Scientist found it advantageous to hold science planning
meetings twice weekly with the scientific investigators to mutually
work out the scientific experiment priorities and scheduling guidelines
for the next 7 days.
BACKGROUND: During the premission simulations, it was found that
resolution of scientific tradeoffs and issues required the full-time
attention of one individual representing the program management.
Scientific expertise and experience were needed to resolve the numerous
issues intelligently. Designation of a Program Scientist, who would
report to the Program Manager and work daily with the investigators
and the flight control team, solved this problem.
The Program Scientist found that having all the scientific investiga-
tors represented at biweekly science planningmeetings had two
substantial advantages:
i, Scientific tradeoffs among experiments could be resolved much more
readily when all parties to a tradeoff or conflict could discuss
the possible solutions face to face. In almost all cases, agree-
ments could be negotiated when all facets of the issues were mutu-
ally understood.
o By resolving priority conflicts in an open forum, all investigators
could see that their experiments were receiving equitable
consideration.
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S.L.L. No.: 8-25
TITLE: FLIGHTMANAGEMENTTEAM'MEETINGS
LESSON LEARNED: Daily meetings of the flight management team during
the manned Skylab missions were an effective method of ensuring that
the conduct of the mission conformed to program requirements. Revisions
of scientific priorities, approval for scientific test objectives that
infringed on normal operational guidelines, approval of added scientif-
ic activities, and other changes in mission requirements were handled
by the flight management team.
BACKGROUND: The Mission Requirements Document for each mission defined
the intended content of each-Skylab mission. Because of unexpected
developments, innumerable changes, variations, and interpretations of
the mission requirements were necessary on a day-to-day basis. For
example, unique lighting conditions made it desirable to get the crew
up 2 hours early for a special Earth resources observation. In another
case, simultaneous observations with Pioneer satellites were desired;
this development required a temporary change in experiment priorities.
Decisions on numerous issues required senior program management approval.
This activity was accomplished readily through the flight management
team meetings chaired by the Program Director (or his deputy).
S.L.L. No.: 8-26
TITLE: FIXED FORMAT VARIABLE DATA DISPLAYS FOR MISSION OPERATIONS
COMPUTER
LESSON LEARNED: Consideration should be given to the design and use of
fixed format variable data displays as opposed to the rigidity/formatted
displays in the mission operations computer (MOC). Also, once a dis-
play has been reconfigured or changed, it should remain in the changed
configuration.
BACKGROUND: The M0C tabular displays used in support of Skylab (e.g.,
universal digital display 1919) were very useful. In fact, they were
used for the entire mission when the capability to change displays was
absent. Extension of this ideato include summary tabulations should
be considered. Because of the rapid turnaround and variable missions
being planned for the future, the long lead time required to change the
rigidity formatted displays will prohibit their use. Designing the
display system to allow real-time reconfiguration should eliminate this
problem.
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S.L.L. No.: 8-27
TITLE: MISSION OPERATIONS COMPUTER LIMITS'DISPLAY
LESSON LEARNED: Limits should be included with the associated teleme-
try parameters in tabulated mission operations computer (MOC) displays,
even at the expense of losing several columns of history data.
BACKGROUND: On Skylab, limits were displayed on separate formats from
the systems data displays. This made it necessary to cross reference
parameters and limits from the two displays, which became very time
consuming and led to many human errors.
S.L.L. No.: 8-28
TITLE: TELEMETRY DATA STORAGE AND RETRIEVAL FACILITIES
LESSON LEARNED: Better telemetry data storage retrieval facilities
are required to aid systems problem solving and experiment data evalu-
ation support.
BACKGROUND: The master data base (DB) technique that evolved in Skylab
would be unacceptable for future programs. It was very easy to store
real-time data in one DB and the corresponding non-real-time data in a
second DB. However, problems were created in generating trend infor-
mation. Serious consideration should be given to providing the follow-
ing capabilities:
l. One continuously accessible master DB containing all data for a
particular mission (this implies some method of data compression
and a large storage capability).
. If continuously accessible data storage is not feasible, a single
DB with a 10-day storage capacity and a selective purge capability
(as opposed to the complete purge as in Skylab) should be provided.
In general, this type of data storage system lends itself to solv-
ing systems problems and evaluating experiments data that require
data covering long periods of time. This type information was dif-
ficult to obtain in Skylab because of the limited size of the DB's
and the very small capability to load the history data.
. Storing data in archives must be done so that individual vehicles
can be loaded from archives in the history DB. Data should either
be archived by vehicle, or a system capability should exist to load
lO0
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data into the history DB from archive by vehicle to make history
loading faster and to provide more DB availability for the vehicle
of interest.
The data storage and retrieval facility should perform functions
such as tape generation, purge/load, archive function, and terminal
input requests in a time-shared manner and not in an exclusive se-
quential fashion. In Skylab, one archive function significantly
decreased response time for terminal inputs and inhibited such func-
tions as load/purge and tape generation.
Indexing archives should be added to the software so that searches
can be made.
S.L.L. No.: 8-29
TITLE: ANCILLARY COMPUTER SUPPORT FOR MISSION CONTROL CENTER CONSOLE
OPERATION
LESSON LEARNED: A small digital computer with programing capability
(e.g., commercial desk type) can be used as an effective supplement to
the ground processors. This small computer can be programed quickly
to fill "gaps" created by new mission objectives that inevitably arise
as the mission progresses.
BACKGROUND: This capability was used frequently during the Skylab
Program.
S.L.L. No.: 8-30
TITLE: OFF-LINE DATA PROCESSING FOR SPACE EXPERIMENTS
LESSON LEARNED: It is recommended that an off-line data processing
system, such as the telemetry history reports in formatted tabulation
(THRIFT) system used for the Apollo Program, be instituted or that
spacecraft experiment data are provided directly to the user for
processing.
BACKGROUND: A THRIFT-type system would minimize routine terminal
operations and unload the Mission Operations Planning System (MOPS) ma-
chines. A significant amount of MOPS terminal time was devoted to gen-
erating experiment data reports, which prohibited the machines and
terminal from being used to assess systems status. Experiment data
processing could have been handled off line or at a remote user loca-
tion. This approach would also have freed the systems engineers to
monitor the systems more closely.
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S.L.L. No.: 8-31
TITLE: USEOFSTOREDCOMMANDSEQUENCES
LESSON LEARNED: Stored program command loads should be developed for
repetitive and fast reaction unattended programs such as synoptic and
flare joint observation programs for the Apollo telescope mount (ATM).
Onboard sequences as well as ground sequences should be considered.
BACKGROUND: The ATM synoptic program was normally performed on a reg-
ular basis and rarely changed. Unattended flare and transient programs
required immediate reaction and were automatic. Joint observation
programs could be programed so that they could be activated by only one
command. This would have permitted activating the programs at Space-
flight Tracking and Data Network sites with acquisition of signal times
less than the required 8 minutes.
S.L.L. No.: 8-32
TITLE: GROUND COMMAND SYSTEM REDUNDANCY
LESSON LEARNED: Avoid building complex command execution redundancy
into a ground system designed to support manned spacecraft. Any com-
mands too critical to be delayed for ground system problems should be
capable of onboard execution with proper voice instruction.
BACKGROUND: For Apollo and Skylab, a "Mode i" remote site backup com-
mand execution capability was established to protect against data line
loss between the Mission Control Center (MCC) and remote sites. This
capability was seldom used, because the ground system problem was usually
caused by a loss of the command computer at the remote site rather than
malfunctioning data lines. Also, it was highly impractical if more
than one MCC console required "Mode i" execution at a single site.
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S.L.L. No.: 9-1
TITLE: CREWRESCUEPROCEDURESTRAINING
LESSON LEARNED: The NASA should periodically either train rescue ele-
ments directly or oversee the training conducted by the Department of
Defense (DOD).
BACKGROUND: Cognizant NASA personnel are usually more familiar with
the operational _procedures for space crew rescue and more experienced
in operating the associated equipment, primarily because of their in-
volvement in developing the equipment and procedures. Also, in Skylab
there was a greater continuity in NASA personnel assignments as opposed
to the frequent turnover of DOD personnel. Additionally, NASA person-
nel were involved with the equipment and procedures and were cognizant
of the latest changes.
S.L.L. No.: 9-2
TITLE: PROCEDURAL DECALS AND LOOSE INSTRUCTION SHEETS
LESSON LEARNED: Procedural decals and loose instruction sheets are an
integral part of crew procedures and, as such, should be distributed
to those principal recipients of the flight data file (FDF). They
should be subject to change and updates in the same manner as those re-
lated procedures in the FDF. They should not be stowed with the hard-
ware as loose instruction sheets but rather as cue cards.
BACKGROUND: Procedural decals and loose instruction sheets caused
procedural problems for the following reasons:
i. Decals were not distributed to the same distribution lists as FDF
items and, therefore, did not receive the same level of review as
FDF items.
2. Large engineering drawings were often used to document decals,
thereby making it difficult to locate a decal of interest.
3. Decals could be generated and installed without significant vis-
ibility from the total operations team.
2. Once launched, decals could be changed only by launching a new
decal on a subsequent flight even though related procedures may
have been modified.
_ECEDING PAGE PLANK NOT F_
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S.L.L. No.: 9-3
TITLE: EXTRA IN-0RBIT EXPERIMENT CONSUMABLES
LESSON LEARNED: Carrying more experiment consumables (film, tapes,
etc.) than had been included in the planning requirement before the
mission and providing in-flight spares for experiments were found de-
sirable to the extent permitted by stowage and weight limitations.
BACKGROUND: The extra experiment consumables permitted increasing
the time allocated for experiments to take advantage of situations in
which:
i. More time became available for all experiments than had been
anti cipated.
2. More time became available for some experiments because of the fail-
ure of other experiments.
3. The emphasis on a given experiment was increased because of unan-
ticipated scientific phenomena (e.g., more active Sun).
The availability of in-flight spares to repair a failed experiment is
an obvious advantage and need not be limited to sparing the entire in-
strument. On both Skylab 3 and Skylab 4, the spare film cannister on
SO19 permitted the continuation of this experiment after one cannister
had jammed. Other examples during Skylab included the use of more Earth
resources experiment package tapes and S082 film than planned for the
second mission and then replacing these consumables on the subsequent
launch.
TITLE: LOW-PRIORITY EXPERIMENT REQUIREMENTS
S.L.L. No.: 9-4
LESSON LEARNED: The acceptance of firm requirements for the perfor-
mance of low-priority experiments during the very early portion of a
mission (first week) should be avoided on missions that require sub-
stantial amounts of activation.
BACKGROUND: During each Skylab mission, the first week was extremely
busy and time was at a premium. Requirements for early observations
for low-priority experiments resulted either in undue interference with
the performance of high-priority experiments or failure to meet the
requirements of the low-priority experiments.
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S.L.L. No.: 9-5
TITLE: OPERATIONAL SUPPORT TO EXPERIMENT GROUPS
LESSON LEARNED: Establish early contacts and information exchange
between experiment developers and crew operations specialists. An
operations representative knowledgeable about crew requirements and
capabilities should be designated to work with potential experiment
suppliers as soon as an experiment is seriously considered for assign-
ment to a manned space-flight system. Experiment developers should be
encouraged to learn what can and cannot be done by space crews before
they proceed with hardware design.
BACKGROUND: The basic operational design, the tentative crew proce-
dures, and the compatibility with mission operations of several Skylab
experiments definitely suffered from a lack of crew operations inputs
early in the development cycle. The resulting need for hardware
redesign, procedural workarounds, and/or continual procedures and time-
line changes proved frustrating to the experimenter and crews and
posed a significant problem to procedures and flight-planning
specialists.
S.L.L. No.: 9-6
TITLE: REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENTS APPLICATIONS
LESSON LEARNED: Environmental requirements for Government furnished
equipment (GFE) hardware should be tailored to the function, criti-
cality, and complexity of the hardware. The broad application of
generalized requirements and general environmental specifications
to the different types of hardware can result in design impact to
accommodate a specification condition that may not apply to the system
under design. Excessive documentation effort and costs can be avoided
by appropriate tailoring of requirements early in the program.
BACKGROUND: In the early part of the Skylab Program, the environmental
requirements for GFE and experiments were obtained from the Apollo
Applications Program (AAP) cluster requirements specification. The
vibration levels were presented in very broad terms for gross areas
of the cluster. Because these levels were severe, they were scrutinized
very carefully. Much less severe levels were found to actually exist
for the particular locations for many hardware items. The extra-
vehicular activity thermal environment was not included as part of the
cluster requirement specification, and a special set of conditions
peculiar to the operating requirements of the extravehicular equipment
had to be generated. A special document, CSD-S-033, "Design Environments
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for CSD Provided Hardware," was generated from the cluster requirements
specification, other engineering sources, and analyses. This document
tailored the general requirements to the specific class of hardware
furnished by the NASA Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center.
S.L.L. No.: 9-7
TITLE: GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT DATA DISSEMINATION
LESSON LEARNED: Transmittals of Government furnished equipment (GFE)
data such as drawings, specifications, interface control documents,
preinstallation acceptance documents, and stowage installation drawings
were disseminated through a single office assigned the responsibility
for ensuring the validity, accuracy, and timely transmittal of the
data.
BACKGROUND: With some 300 items of ancillary GFE and 18 data require-
ments for each item, informal data transmittals caused severe account-
ability problems. Different sites had different data on the same
GFE items. Verbal requests among Centers, contractors, and technical
monitors increased. To solve these problems, a data requirements
checklist was prepared for each item, and all transmittals of data
were recorded. All transmittals were made by a single office, and the
checklists accompanied the transmittals. Redundant transmissions
ceased and omissions were corrected. Uniformity in the data resulted,
and the previous communication problems were eliminated.
S.L.L. No.: 9-8
TITLE: COMPLETE CHANGE PACKAGE CONCEPT
LESSON LEARNED: An attempt to establish a complete hardware change
package concept tended to cause more problems than it solved. The
rule of not processing a change until all related documentation changes
were included in the package delayed the processing of important changes.
A backlog of changes should not be allowed. Potential changes should
be brought before a configuration control board (CCB) on a timely basis
for initial approval or disapproval, without waiting to complete all
the related documentation changes.
BACKGROUND: During the early phases of the Skylab Program, many
configuration changes were approved; however, as implementation pro-
ceeded, related changes were identified in other documentation and
processed separately. To correct the situation, the total change
concept was put into effect in 1971.
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This concept had manyshortcomings. For example, a proposed change
could not be brought to the CCBuntil the mission requirements document
and stowage list change paper were prepared. This process was very slow
because of the low priority for changes that did not have CCB approval.
In late 1972, there was a backlog of more than 60 major changes for
which complete change package requirements were not fully met. The
solution was to hold several inter-Center CCB meetings on all out-
standing changes with the best available data being presented to the
board at that time. The CCB minutes provided authority to proceed or
stop work on each questionable item.
S.L.L. No.: 9-9
TITLE: CONSOLIDATED STATUS OF GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT
REQUIREMENTS AND DELIVERIES
LESSON LEARNED: A consolidated report was prepared and maintained on
the quantity and schedules for all Government furnished equipment (GFE)
required to support spacecraft testing and launch. This report served
as a single authoritative source of information to the hardware
suppliers and to the receiving organizations. Information on each item
of GFE required to support each spacecraft test procedure should be
developed early in the program and updated regularly. Data that record
planned and actual deliveries to satisfy the spacecraft test require-
ments should also be maintained.
BACKGROUND: Early in Skylab, many status reports were issued for various
GFE and experiment items, but there was no single source of data that
indicated each equipment item required for each test sequence at each
site. Matrices were devised that indicated all these requirements.
The matrices provided the basis for the development of control sheets
that indicated delivery status for each requirement.
As a result of this activity, reliable status information was available,
and the visibility necessary for effective GFE management resulted.
The GFE deliveries for test and checkout activities at McDonnel_ Douglas
Astronautics Company - West, McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company -
East, the George C. Marshall Space Flight Center, Martin Marietta
Corporation, and the John F. Kennedy Space Center were accomplished on
a timely basis for essentially all test requirements.
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S.L.L. No.: 9-10
TITLE: USEOFSPECIFICATION/ASSEMBLYDRAWINGSFORSIMPLEHARDWAREEND,ITEMS
LESSON LEARNED: Certain types of hardware lend themselves to a simpler
method than an end-item specification for detailing the design and
performance requirements and assembly, while still providing for
adequate definition, control, qualification, and delivery of flight
items. A specification/assembly drawing that shows the pictorial
requirements together with design, performance, qualification, and
acceptance test requirements was found to be adequate for numerous
simple items of Skylab hardware.
BACKGROUND: Although NASA Procurement Circular (NPC) 500-1 is appro-
priate for complex items incorporating many lesser items requiring new
design, it imposes requirements far in excess of those needed for
nonfunctional items or items requiring use of off-the-shelf hardware
with minor modifications. A specification/assembly drawing was used
during Skylab to meet the rapid response necessary to provide a flight
article within constrained time lines. This method proved satisfactory,
resulted in meeting the mission schedule at a great cost savings
(estimated at a factor of l0 to 1), and satisfied the requirements of
safety, reliability, quality, and configuration control.
A comparison of NPC 500-1 requirements (unmodified) as shown in
MSC 01h80, 01481, 01360, 01399, 01400, 01402, 01482 and 01485 (specifi-
cations for comfort clothing) and SEC ll100124 (specification/assembly
drawing for orbital workshop firehose) provides a graphic example of
the amount of reduction in data in the use of the different methods.
S.L.L. No.: 9-11
TITLE: COORDINATION WITH SCIENTISTS AND PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATORS
LESSON LEARNED: For short-duration missions, the following guidelines
are recommended to maximize the scientific results:
.
A definitive scientific management program should be developed within
NASA, and each Principal Investigator (PI) should be informed of
his responsibilities to NASA as well as N_LSA's responsibility to
the (PI).
.
The grouping of similar experiments into a single package (such as
Apollo telescope mount (ATM)) is highly desirable from a scientific
and economic standpoint.
, iii
. The ATM czar (the ATM principal spokesman) concept should be
expanded with the czar at mission control empowered to make deci-
sions and conduct detailed planning within broad guidelines pro-
vided by the PI's.
. Real-time data downlinks must be used to provide quick-look results
that can be exploited during the mission. If telemetry data are
provided, the PI's must be able to use it and the flight control
system must be flexible enough to accept real-time procedure changes
resulting from the quick analysis of the data.
BACKGROUND: Coordination among PI's within a given science discipline
was sometimes difficult, even though all werelocated at the NASA
Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center. Use of the czar concept provided good
coordination among the ATM PI's.
S.L.L. No.: 9-12
TITLE: THE NASA/DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OPERATIONAL SUPPORT INTERFACE
LESSON LEARNED: The NASA Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center (JSC) should
maintain single points of contact with the Department of Defense (DOD)
for the various types of military support required. The DOD point-of-
contact organization(s) should be co-located with their NASA counter-
parts for any real-time operation.
BACKGROUND: During the Skylab and earlier programs, this single point-
of-contact relationship was maintained for recovery support, including
postretrieval logistics and NASA recovery communications, through the
D0D Manned Space Flight Support Office (DDMS). This single point-of-
contact relationship provided the following advantages:
i. More effective and continuous communications while not precluding
direct interface between JSC representatives and individual DOD
elements.
. Direct interface with a DOD organization having the authority
to take immediate action in directing its subordinate elements re-
sulted in more effective and timely support to JSC's requests.
3. Only one financial contract was necessary.
4. A DOD point of contact was able to determine which DOD organization
could best provide the requested support.
5. The DOD point of contact was able to eliminate unnecessary requests
from other D0D elements.
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The NASArecovery/DDMSinterrelationship during Project Mercury, and
the Gemini, Apollo, and Skylab Programsworked satisfactorily, even
though DDMSwas located at Patrick Air Force Base, Florida, and NASA
recovery was located at JSC, only because DDMBpersonnel relocated
themselves to JSC during actual operations. During simulation exercise,
it was not possible to control the operation adequately when this co-
location did not exist.
S.L.L. No.: 9-13
TITLE: AUTOMATICDIGITALNETWORKTELETYPESUPPORT
LESSON LEARNED: The Department of Defense (DOD) Automatic Digital Net-
work (AUTODIN) system is an effective system for transmittal of opera-
tional teletype traffic to military elements.
BACKGROUND: Recovery teletype support for the latter Apollo missions
and the Skylab Program was provided almost entirely through the DOD
common user system, AUTODIN, instead of through dedicated circuitry.
This system is considerably less costly than dedicated circuitry or
commercial carriers; instead of paying monthly rates (for dedicated
circuitry) or instead of paying on a "per work" basis (for commercial
carrier), NASA pays only for access to the system. Also, an adequate
"transmittal to receipt" time line can be provided through the AUTODIN
system for operational traffic if a "priority" or "ops immediate" pre-
cedence is used.
S.L.L. No.: 9-14
TITLE: LEASING DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE VOICE CIRCUITRY
LESSON LEARNED: When possible, the NASA should lease voice circuitry
through the Department of Defense (DOD).
BACKGROUND: During Skylab and earlier missions, NASA leased recovery-
related circuitry through the Defense Communications Agency (DCA).
When a joint NASA/DOD effort is involved, it is possible for NASA to
obtain circuitry through the D0D at minimum cost. In some instances,
this savings is as much as 50 percent when compared with the cost of
leasing the circuitry directly from a commercial carrier. This savings
is possible because the DCA, through its suborganization, the Defense
Commercial Communications Office (DECC0), leases groups of circuits
(called "telpak") between many locations. Additionally, if the primary
use of the circuit is for D0D purposes and the circuit is already
available from DCA assets, the DOD may provide the circuit at no cost
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to NASA. It should be noted that in the past, the DODcould not provide
circuitry to NASAunless the application of the circuit was D0Drelated.
S.L.L. No.: 9-15
TITLE: EXPERIMENTDATAHANDLINGPROCEDURES
LESSON LEARNED :
i. Establish single control authority for the complete experiment data
processing to ensure maximum commonality, including the review,
analyses, and resolution of experiment data processing problems
and interfaces.
2. Assign experiment data decompression processing to a single
organization.
3. Use only one computer system in each data processing operation in
which various manufacturer's tape drivers are used.
BACKGROUND: Three coordination organizations were involved in Earth
resources experiment package (EREP) data processing. The EREP downlink
data tapes were processed through three laboratories to obtain computer
compatible tapes. For example, biomedical tapes were prepared by the
lll0 UNIVAC for the Xerox computer; EREP decompression computer compat-
ible tapes were prepared on Ampex and Control Data Corporation drives
at one location; they were prepared for UNIVAC drives at a second loca-
tion, and for IBM/UNIVAC drives at still a third location. Each time
computer compatible tapes were prepared on one manufacturer's drive for
processing on another manufacturer's equipment, a compatibility proce-
dure had to be established and managed on a continuous basis. The
greater the number of organizational elements involved, the more com-
plex and time consuming the problems.
S.L.L. No.: 9-16
TITLE: PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE PARTICIPATION
LESSON LEARNED: Public Affairs Office (PA0) participation in mission
monitoring and in-flight management team meetings facilitated effective
dissemination of accurate news information. The PA0 sponsored a press
briefing by the Flight Director during each shift change to keep the
press up to date on mission progress and developments.
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BACKGROUND: The PAO participation in mission support and mission
management activites was mandatory to ensure that released information
was accurate. Periodic press conferences with the crew in orbit were
found to be satisfactory if some prior screening of the questions had
been accomplished.
8.L.L. No.: 9-17
TITLE: COORDINATE SYSTEMS - MASS PROPERTIES
LESSON LEARNED: A minimum number of coordinate systems should be
adopted to avoid the confusion and the number of coordination meetings
resulting from multiple coordinate systems.
BACKGROUND: The Apollo and Skylab Programs used numerous different
coordinate systems. The Skylab Program used l0 distinct systems. Much
confusion and coordination activity resulted from the efforts to trans-
fer from one coordinate system to another.
SECTIONi0
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S.L.L. No.: i0-i
TITLE: GOVERNMENTSOURCEINSPECTIONONDEVELOPMENTVERIFICATIONTEST
UNIT HARDWARE
LESSON LEARNED: The requirement for Government source inspection of
development verification test unit (DVTU) hardware, with its associated
problems of implementation, is not Justified in view of the intended
usage of the hardware.
BACKGROUND: On several Skylab experiments (e.g., M092 and M133),
problems were encountered at the time of delivery of DVTU hardware for
which source inspection was required. The inspector was at a disadvan-
tage because he did not have a NASA governing specification to follow
(the end-item specification was not applicable to DVTU hardware), and
considerable confusion and some delay resulted. In addition, minor
performance discrepancies that were acceptable to the NASA Lyndon B.
Johnson Space Center technical monitor proved to be difficult to
resolve with the government source inspector, and some delays in
delivery occurred.
S.L.L. No.: 10-2
TITLE: ACCEPTANCE DATA PACKAGE REQUIREMENTS
LESSON LEARNED: Skylab data packages contained information that could
have been delivered to the NASA Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center (JSC) in
a more efficient manner. Some examples of this information are
engineering drawings; operating, maintenance, and handling procedures;
configuration specifications; acceptance review reports; and all
material review records.
A program-wide document defining the necessary contents of the accept-
ance data package (ADP) should be prepared early in the program, and
its requirements should be binding on all contractors and other
cognizant Centers.
BACKGROUND: Acceptance data packages were delivered to JSC for file:
one remained with the contractor, and one copy was sent with the
hardware. This resulted in all data requiring revision to be period-
ically updated, even ADP's that were not being used. In the future,
any data not specifically required for receiving inspection should be
excluded fr_n the ADP. Hardware for Skylab was being delivered from
various contractors and Centers with no uniformly established ground
rules regarding deliverable data elements for the ADP. The George C.
Marshall Space Flight Center issued MPD 8040.14 and JSC established its
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requirements by letter KT-72671. Both documents were released after
hardware was moving through the delivery cycle, and total compliance
was not possible.
REFERENCE: JSC-KA-68-1, MPD 8040.14, JSC itr KT-72671, and
MBFC itr SL-AL/MDA 332-72.
S.L.L. No.: 10-3
TITLE: USE OF CONTRACTOR PERSONNEL IN LIEU OF NASA INSPECTORS TO
VERIFY PRODUCTION
LESSON LEARNED: The use of contractor manufacturing personnel in lieu
of a NASA inspector to verify production sequences may improve timing
and reduce costs.
BACKGROUND: During the Skylab Program, verification of planning
sequences by contractor personnel was instituted. Selected lead men
were trained and authorized to validate inspection sequences with a
"Manufacturing Verify" stamp. Inspection time and cost were reduced by
this in-line method of verification. Because of the success of the
endeavor, certain selected manufacturing personnel below the lead man
level were also trained and authorized to function in the "Manufacturing
Verify" practice. The system should be considered and expanded for
future programs.
S.L.L. No.: 10-4
TITLE: PROTECTION OF CRITICAL EQUIPMENT DURING STORAGE AND
TRANSPORTATION
LESSON LEARNED: Equipment in short supply, easily susceptible to shock
or water damage, or not easily replaceable should be protected in
storage warehouses and transportation vehicles as follows:
i. Place duplicate equipment at different locations as a means of
protection from adverse environments.
2. Transport flight and backup articles by separate shipments.
3. Shelter equipment from rising water or leaky roofs that can result
from storm damage.
119
4. Store shock-susceptible equipment on lower shelves to minimize the
potential energy in case the equipment should fall or be dropped.
. Place rails on all shelves where critical equipment is located and
fasten shelves to surrounding building structure to avoid equip-
ment damage during earthquakes, Earth tremors, or other means of
shaking shelves.
6. Consider special handling for critical equipment to reduce the risk
of damage.
BACKGROUND: A series of Earth tremors during 1972 and 1973 in diverse
places increased the concern for protection of equipment vital for
Apollo, Skylab, and Apollo-Soyuz Test Project (ASTP) space operations.
Cans about the size of Apollo gyros were thrown from foodstore shelves
in Ventura, California, by an Earth tremor. An Earth tremor also rocked
Boston. Both of these locations had Apollo, Skylab, and ASTP guidance
and navigation equipment housed near the epicenter. Preventive action
was applied immediately, and incremental audits were carried out for
verification. In another incident, one major Skylab experiment was
involved in a truck accident.
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S.L.L. No.: ii-i
TITLE: EXPERIMENTWINDOWSIN SCIENTIFICAIRLOCKSBECAMESTRUCTURAL
ELEMENTS
LESSON LEARNED: Windows and structures in simple scientific experiments
became parts of the basic Skylab pressure vessel when they were installed
in the scientific airlock. Additional rigor and analysis were required
for these experiments, particularly with regard to the glass windows,
because failure could cause loss of pressure in the orbital workshop.
BACKGROUND: The importance of some of the experiment windows exposed
to vacuum was recognized following a detailed scrutiny and assessment
of all Skylab windows. Small experimen_ suppliers were not prepared to
perform the detailed fracture mechanics analysis on their windows com-
mensurate with crew safety. Accordingly, to ensure the safety of the
design, both the NASA Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center and the NASA
George C. Marshall Space Flight Center performed such analyses and
established the necessary design requirements that were subsequently
implemented.
S. L.L. No. : 11-2
TITLE: CONTRACTOR SAFETY TASKS
LESSON LEARNED: Contractor safety tasks should be defined and bounded
in the statement of work. Tasks should be tailored to the hardware to
be developed.
BACKGROUND: Implementation of a safety program after the contract has
been awarded is difficult and expensive. Early implementation of the
safety program will ensure that safety requirements are included in the
hardware design without costly changes.
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S.L.L. No.: 12-1
TITLE: STOWAGENOMENCLATURESTANDARDIZATION
LESSON LEARNED: Hardware nomenclature should be standardized through-
out a program. On Skylab, many names existed for a single item, and
this nonstandardization resulted in confusion, ambiguity, and lost time
during communications among various user groups.
BACKGROUND: On Skylab, the nomenclature of a given item varied
relative to drawings, stowage lists, flightcrew titles, nameplates and
decals, and weight reports.
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S.L.L. No.: 13-1
TITLE: EXPERIMENTSGUIDELINEDOCUMENT
LESSON LEARNED: A simplified NASA document should be prepared and issued
for use by the manned space-flight experiment developers. The document
should be an accurate and easy-to-understand guide that can be used by
organizations with little or no previous experience with NASA programs.
BACKGROUND: The Apollo Applications Program Experiments General
Specification Document, which was prepared by NASA Headquarters in
March 1969, was an attempt to provide the Skylab experiment developers
with such guidelines. It coordinated the rigorous NASA Lyndon B.
Johnson Space Center Apollo Applications Program Experiment Hardware
General Requirements with other Centers and provided instructions on
the importance of extracting minimum applicable requirements. However,
it became increasingly evident during various phases of the program
that some universities, hospitals, small laboratories, and large
corporations acting as experiment developers were nevertheless unaware
of many of the necessary NASA regulations, procedures, and requirements.
In addition, some experiment developers, although aware of many of the
necessary NASA requirements, had no idea of how to go about the task
of satisfying them_ other experimenters chose to ignore the various
requirements because of contractual interpretations. The previously
mentioned situations have proved costly and could be minimized if a
document were prepared for small and first-time NASA contractors that
would assemble the critical requirements (both technical and managerial)
into a logical, unambiguous sequence with specific references.
S.L.L. No.: 13-2
TITLE: EXPERIMENT REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENTS
LESSON LEARNED: Experiment requirements documents (ERD's) should
clearly define what the experiment investigator requires and the results
he expects. The ERD's should not include detailed implementation data
because the latter requirements are subject to frequent change and are
necessarily documented elsewhere.
BACKGROUND: Skylab ERD's, especially on medical experiments, included
many details from the end-item specifications, the installed and stowed
crew procedures, test procedures, etc. Inclusion of these details
caused a very high traffic in documentation changes to the ERD's on a
monthly basis without significant benefit.
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S.L.L. No.: 13-3
TITLE: EXPERIMENT RETURN REQUIREMENTS
LESSON LEARNED: Requirements that impose constraints on the return of
experiments must be submitted early enough before a mission to allow
time for adequate review and preparation for implementation.
BACKGROUND: Requirements imposing constraints on the return of Skylab
experiments were often submitted so late that they were difficult, if
not impossible, to meet. These requirements were often incompatible
with the operational capability of the return containers or the ship-
board removal environment, and their late submittal resulted in a dis-
proportionate effort in resolving or meeting them. Additional
attention must be made to ensure the early submittal and resolution of
Shuttle experiment return requirements.
S.L.L. No.: 13-4
TITLE: USE OF MINI-COMPUTER FOR PROCESSING EARTH RESOURCES EXPERIMENT
DATA
LESSON LEARNED :
i, The use of minicomputer technology for processing Earth resources
experiment package (EREP) data was basically cost effective and
technically valid.
, For a facility concept like the EREP, sensor designs and ground
processing requirements for the experiment data should be developed
in parallel. The user's (principal investigator's) requirements
should be considered early in the software development phase. This
approach should result in a more efficient, cost-effective, data-
processingsystem.
3. Develop computer loading models early; update through implementation.
BACKGROUND: The Earth resources production data system was designed to
process electronic sensor data collected remotely in both spacecraft
and aircraft overflights. The system included two fully equipped mini-
computers, manufactured by the Digital Equipment Corporation, each of
which contained 48K of core memory, 32K of semiconductor memory, four
tape transports, two disks, a line printer, a card reader_ teletype, a
display and keyboard, high-density tape, and an instrumentation recorder.
The system allowed for data conversion to tape, then plots, microfilm,
etc. Raw processing speed was comparable to large systems.
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S.L.L. No.: 13-5
TITLE: SELF-BALANCINGTECHNIQUEUSEDIN S194 L-BANDRADIOMETER
LESSON LEARNED: The self-balancing technique used in the S194 L-band
radiometer provided an adaptive integration constant with a long-time
constant during steady-state conditions and a much shortened effective
time constant when a transient in brightness temperature was followed.
This measurement technique worked effectively and should be considered
for other types of sensors.
BACKGROUND: During design of the S194 radiometer, this technique was
selected to ensure the best accuracy and sensitivity. Radiometers of
this type are very susceptible to gaining variations of their amplifier
circuits, and the self-balancing technique separated this effect from
changes caused by the signal being measured.
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S.L.L. No. : 14-1
TITLE: INTERFACEVERIFICATION(FIT-CHECK)MATRIXREQUIREMENTS
LESSON LEARNED: Interface verification matrices should be established
to ensure adequate fit checks of critical Government furnished equip-
ment (GFE) hardware interfaces. A specific organization should be
charged with the responsibility for generating and completing these
matrices.
BACKGROUND: For the Skylab Program, fit-check matrices were developed
and implemented for all interfaces between GFE to GFE and GFE to
contractor furnished equipment (CFE). Development of the matrices was
accomplished over a 6-month period. The matrices were generated for
every baselined GFE hardware item, including all changes to the base-
line designs as applicable. This system was found satisfactory for
ensuring that all critical interfaces were verified before flight.
Omission of the noncritical hardware might have saved some time and
effort without penalty.
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